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FORCING RESCUE: THE
LANDSCAPE OF HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER
OBLIGATIONS TO
TREAT PATIENTS
Barry R. Furrowt
INTRODUCTION.
POOR CITIZEN living in America suffers a range of indignities-poor housing and diet, limited educational opportunities, a
high risk of becoming a crime victim. Restricted access to health
care is another such indignity, a fatal one in the wrong circumstances. Between 1975 and 1986 the proportion of low income persons covered by Medicaid fell from 63% to 38%, primarily due to
tightened eligibility requirements.1 During this same period the
number of Americans living at or above 125% of the federal poverty level increased by 27%.2 Hospitals' abilities to subsidize indigent care by cost-shifting to private payers have diminished, as they
are forced to negotiate discounts with insurers and employers. 3
Employers now offer fewer and less extensive health care options to
their employees, including reduced dependent coverage. Those who
lack health insurance have trouble finding care.4 A 1986 study
found that nearly 14 million people said they did not even seek
health care because they would not be able to afford it.' The situation has only deteriorated since 1986. "The uninsured are less
likely to get their young children adequately immunized, less likely
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to receive prenatal care, less likely to have their blood pressure
checked, and less likely to see a physician even when they have serious symptoms." 6 When uninsured patients do seek care from hospitals, they are often turned away or superficially treated and
transferred to stressed and overburdened public hospitals.' When
they do receive health care in hospitals, indigent patients experience
a higher mortality rate because they do not receive as many highcost procedures.8
America has a health care access problem that makes us the
embarrassment of modem industrialized societies. Yet, ironically,
Americans seem to view access to health care as almost a "right",
an egalitarian value that led to political passage of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.9 These programs consume a significant portion
of state and federal budgets, in contrast to housing and food policies
characterized mostly by their penuriousness. Access to health care,
with government help, has become part of American political consciousness. 10 A principle of egalitarianism has at times driven national health policy, fueled by public discomfort at the thought of
not providing the poor and the elderly with a financial net when
they face catastrophic illness and its expense. At the same time, the
strong libertarian streak imbedded in the American character has
often braked the ship of state, diverting impulses toward consistent
funding for the poor by supporting a conception of health care as a
service best provided by physicians and providers within the param6. Dowell, supra note 1, at 142. See generally Colin McCord & Harold P. Freeman,

Excess Mortality in Harlem, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 173 (1990).
7. Andrew B. Bindman et. al., Consequences of Queuingfor Care At a Public Hospital
Emergency Department,266 JAMA 1091 (1991). See generally Emily Friedman, Public Hospitals" Doing What Everyone Wants Done But Few Others Wish to Do, 257 JAMA 1437
(1987); Andrew B. Bindman et. al., A Public Hospital Closes: Impact on Patients' Access to
Care and Health Status, 264 JAMA 2899 (1990).
8. Jack Hadley et. al., Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients: Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome, 265 JAMA 374 (1991). For an
excellent survey of research on problems caused by limited access to health care, see Karen
Davis, Inequality and Access to Health Car4 69 MILBANK Q. 253 (1991).
9. The notion of a "right" to health care can mean many different things, from a constitutionally based guarantee like that in the Italian constitution, to a statutory claim based
on eligibility thresholds such as Medicare eligibility. For a range of definitions, see Mark
Kelman, Health Care Rights: Distinct Claims, Distinct Justifications, 3 STAN. L & PoL'Y.
REv. 90 (1991). See also James F. Blumstein, FinancingUncompensated Care: An Approach
to the Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511 (1988); Sarah H. Carey, A Constitutional Right to
Health Care: An Unlikely Development, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 492 (1974).
10. The best treatment of cultural attitudes of Americans toward welfare and toward
health care services can be found in THEODORE R. MARMOR ET. AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES (1990).
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eters of contract and charity." "Trust us," resonate doctors at the
frequency of libertarianism. "We are professionals, driven by our
fiduciary duties to help you." "Grant us respect," chant hospitals,
"for we are charities with all that implies." "Leave politics out of
health care," the full chorus repeats in a basso ostinato, "for we are
nonpolitical."
The realm of "rights" talk offers a useful frame of reference for
discussing the current state of access to health care. Judge-made
and statutory requirements imposed on health care providers-to
rescue patients from a crisis, to fund free care, to mandate benefits-are "rights"-based approach to health care access. Under
what circumstances, then, are physicians, health care providers, and
insurers compelled to treat patients (or pay for their treatment) at
the risk of some legal penalty for failure to comply? What moral
vision of health care obligations, unifies these obligations imposed
on providers by regulatory schemes, with insurance law obligations
imposed by the courts, the handling of "bad debts" by taxing authorities, tax exemptions, and judicially imposed rules? Finally,
what more can be done to promote access to necessary health care?
The current debate over national health insurance may lead to
broad-based reform of the American system. Or it may not. Comprehensive reform of our expensive, and yet, inadequate, health care
system awaits the commitment of a new President facing a powerful
array of interest groups. Even if some system reform results from
the efforts of a new administration, "rescue" obligations will still
need to be explored and expanded. This article will pursue a
"rights"-based approach, unfashionable in an era of efficiency,
scarce resources, and sympathy for constraints on health care providers. The exquisite sensitivity to the world of scarce resources,
often displayed by analysts, too readily concedes to providers their
desires to retain as much autonomy as possible and to prevent further slippage away from the era of the blank check and the independent provider. Affirmative obligations by courts, tax
collectors, and other agents of the state, while certainly inefficient
11. The social legislation of the sixties and seventies pushed America toward an egalitarian model of health care delivery.
A uniquely American phenomenon, however, has been the endeavor to extract an
egalitariandistribution of health care from a delivery system still firmly grounded
in libertarianprinciples... in no other modem society espousing egalitarian principles for the distribution of health care have physicians and hospitals been quite so
free as they have in the United States to organize their facilities as they see fit, to
practice medicine as they see fit, and to price their services as they see fit.

Uwe E. Reinhardt, Uncompensated Hospital Care, in UNCOMPENSATED
RIGHTS AND REsPONSIBILTMEs 8-9 (Frank A. Sloan et. al. eds., 1986).
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and problematic at times, have advantages. Such obligations
tighten the screws on the health care industry, force physicians to
better define their professional responsibilities, and stretch the resources of providers and insurers in socially valuable directions.
These pressures may speed reform of financial and structural barriers to access. More indigent individuals will ultimately receive
more and better care than at present, through expanded obligations
of providers to care for patients-to "rescue" them from their distress. 2 Such obligations are not imposed by agents of the state out
of thin air; they are grounded in the definition of health professionalism, the images and promises projected by providers, and the concrete expectations created. They are therefore morally justifiable,
and as such, not simply conscription without justification.
A. The Definition of "Rescue"
A duty to rescue is an enforceable legal obligation to help someone out of a situation of peril without a specific prior agreement to
do so and without the promise of compensation. Such burdens run
the gamut from a doctor treating a stranger in an emergency without the promise of payment, to a hospital providing free care and
tolerating a certain level of bad debts, to an insurer paying for
health care treatment without a prior agreement to do so. The
phrase "uncompensated care" is often used to describe these externally imposed burdens on providers, and "mandated benefits" are
those which statutes require employers to provide. 3 These phrases
have a clinical sound that obscures the real desperation of individuals presenting in distress, whether to an emergency room or a doctor's office. I prefer to use the phrase "forced rescue" to better
capture the desperation of the vulnerable, in need of rescue, and the
resistance of providers to such rescue, therefore requiring the coercive power of legal institutions.
A forced rescue context involves a vulnerable person in need,
someone who will suffer or die from the denial of an essential health
care service, 4 and a provider who is linked to the vulnerable person
by one of a number of connections. These links are discovered or
12. See Robert J. Blendon et. al., Uncompensated CareBy Hospitals or Public Insurance
for the Poor Does It Make A Difference?, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 1160 (1986) (suggesting that
growing reliance on uncompensated care may adversely affect the health care received by the

poor).
13. Hawaii mandates benefits as the result of an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act) waiver. See generally BARRY FuRRow ET. Al-, HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2nd ed. 1990).
14. For an earlier treatment of some of these issues, see George J. Annas, Beyond the
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constructed by courts and legislatures. Some justifications for forcing rescue on providers include:
* a definition of the provider role, and the duties inherent in that
role, that transcends contract limits;
a the creation of reasonable expectations by the provider and reliance by patients;
* a utilitarian justification in "easy" or cost effective rescue
situations;
* recognition of the economic and technological power of providers and the reciprocal burdens such power should properly
require.
B.

The Role of Affirmative Duties

Is it misguided to cast social and even legal obligations on individual professionals and the medical profession collectively? Skeptics claim providers have obligations bearing on distributive justice
only through "specific contractual arrangements when they enter
into roles within the social system of health-care institutions."1 5
When existing institutional arrangements for the provision of health
care fail, these skeptics contend that the full extent of provider obligations is to work toward new arrangements to achieve a just distribution of health care.
Thus, the individual physician or resident does not have an obligation to treat the underserved patients unless he has undertaken
such an obligation through prior agreements and decisions. But
if such patients exist, then institutional structures, such as incentives which work through reimbursement structures, have to be
altered so that some physicians
are drawn into undertaking the
16
appropriate obligations.
This is a narrow position: positing obligations created through
preexisting contract relations, and expanding obligations to care for
needy patients only through voluntarily accepted new distributive
structures.
The customary arguments against affirmative obligations to provide care are threefold. First, provision of free health care by providers typically requires an unfair and inefficient cross subsidy from
one group of patients to another." However, given the vagaries of
hospital pricing structures generally, cross subsidization may not be
Good Samaritan: Should Doctors Be Required to Provide Essential Services?, 8 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Apr. 1978, at 16.
15. NoRMAN DANIELS, JusT HEALTH CARE 118 (1985).

16. Id. at 119.
17. See Foster,supra note 3, at 261.
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any less fair than hospital charges to paying patients.1 8 If such a
subsidy is imposed on all providers, and external payers resist increased charges, the profession will absorb the costs through somewhat lower wages. This is hardly unfair to patients. For example,
if a state were to require a certain level of annual pro bono care by
each physician as a condition for receiving and retaining a medical
license, this would be a subsidy internal to the profession, simply
another requirement for the license. It may be objectionable to the
medical profession, but it is not unfair to patients and may not be
unfair to doctors if the burden is not excessive and is fairly distributed among them.
Second, critics argue that it is preferable to use the power of the
government to provide rescue in a systematic way, using the power
of taxation to fairly spread the cost. This assumes reducing or eliminating uncompensated care of all kinds. Such a distributional answer through government funding increases may well be preferable,
assuring everyone some minimal level of necessary care. But in a
world of deficits and scarce resources, a second best solution will
have to suffice. Legal obligations serve a vital gap-filling role in
stretching resources in such a world.
Third, libertarian critics object to any affirmative obligation not
freely chosen by a provider by claiming that such an obligation is
"coercive" and likely to impose excessive enforcement costs. Richard Epstein argues that in the case of moral duties to rescue, "a
system of informal norms may influence behavior more effectively
than a system of legal coercion."1 9 Self-help motivated by benevolence and altruism is preferable, he contends, and intermediate social institutions-charities, social leaders-can do the job.2" "It is a
mistake to think that legal bonds only reinforce social bonds. In
many instances, they overpower and destroy them."2 1 On this view,
altruism is stifled by obligations imposed by the state through its
agents-courts and the legislature.22 Yet, this critique fails to rec18. "[l]f
the hospital did not treat the poor, its pricing behavior for paying patients
would not necessarily be any less irrational or exploitive. It would only make different use of
the profits." Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatusof Nonprofit Hospital"
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307, 363 n.198 (1991).
19. Richard A. Epstein, Book Review: Rights and "Rights Talk'1 105 HARV. L. REV.
1106, 1118 (1992) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)).

20. Id at 1118.
21. Id at 1119.
22. Ronald M. Green, Altruism in Health Care, in BENEFICENCE AND HEALTH CARE
239 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1982) addresses this concern.
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ognize the complex new world of health care systems, professional
obligations, and bureaucratic health care. Legal bonds also create
social bonds that were nonexistent or weak to start with, and may
bolster fading charitable impulses.
The health care industry and medical professionals have extensive affirmative obligations: hospitals as charities exist by legal policy through the tax code, massively subsidized by implicit national
policy; physicians are licensed by the state, measured against a role
defined by licensing boards and courts, and credentialled by hospital medical staffs in conformity with mandated institutional requirements. An abstract debate about coercion and social versus legal
bonds is largely irrelevant to the more complicated issues of providing health care. Health care providers resemble public utilities
in some of their characteristics: they provide basic needs, they operate within an environment in which market forces function
poorly, and they require external regulation.
Beneficence is not a suitable starting point for questions of access to health care. A system of duties and rights needs to be motivated independently of beneficence.23 An ideal health care system
would not have to rely on forced rescue, but surely rescue can be
demanded in the absence of the ideal. In an imperfect world where
some people experience inadequate health care access all the time,
and others some of the time, legal obligations serve to counter the
deficiencies of voluntarism, the shortcuts induced by market pressures, and rapidly shrinking insurance coverage for millions of people. We should prefer five hundred thousand points of induced
rescue to a thousand points of overburdened voluntarism.
I.

PHYSICIANS ALONE

The poor are poor, and one's sorry for them, but there it is. As
civilization moves forward, the shoe is bound to pinch in places,
and it's absurd to pretend that anyone is responsible personally.
(Mr. Wilcox)24
Those in need of necessary medical care are stranded between
the world of contracted-for care and government funded care. But
is this justifiable? Philosophers considering the obligations of health
care providers argue that "in the US at least, an individual provider,
and the profession as a whole, have no legal obligation to distribute
services except to patients to whom they already have contractual
23.

JOHN P. REEDER, JR., BENEFICENCE,

SUPEREROGATION, AND ROLE DUTY, BE-

83 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1982).
24. E. M. FORSTER, HOWARD'S END 188 (Vintage Books 1973) (1910).
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obligations."2 This proposition is so circumscribed by judicial and
other restrictions as to be false in practice. A principled framework
for legal obligations to treat those in need, prior to any contractual
obligation, and expanded obligations to treat them once the nexus is
created, will be established below.
A. From Contract to Covenant
Health care today is most often delivered within institutionswhether hospitals, ambulatory care clinics, or HMO offices-but it
is still the individual physician who sees the patient, diagnoses the
problem, and prescribes the treatment. This physician also controls
the consumption of more than 70% of the health care dollars spent,
by directing patients to particular loci of diagnosis and treatment in
laboratories and hospitals. The starting point is therefore the obligations on a physician outside an institution.

1.

THE CONTRACT MODEL.

Courts often assume the contract

model as the starting point for their analysis of tort duties in the
doctor-patient relationship.26 The contract foundations of the doctor-patient relationship are often summarized, hornbook style, in
tort decisions. Thus, physicians in private practice may contract
their services as they see fit and retain substantial control over the
extent of their contact with patients.2' Physicians may limit their
specialty and scope of practice, their geographic area, and the hours
and conditions under which they will see patients. There is no obligation to offer services that a patient may require outside the physician's competence and training; or services outside the scope of the
original physician-patient agreement, where the physician has limited the contract to a type of procedure, to an office visit, or to con25. Daniels, supra note 15, at 116.
26. Roger D. Masters, Is ContractAn Adequate Basisfor Medical Ethics? 5 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Dec. 1975, at 24.
27. When, for example, a doctor employed by an insurance company examines an individual for the purpose of qualifying him for insurance coverage, most courts considering the
issue have held that a doctor owes no duty to the individual to treat or to disclose problems
discovered during the examination. The justification is the lack of a doctor-patient relationship, and the rationale that there is a lack of an expectation by the person examined that he is
being diagnosed for purposes of treatment. The screening function dominates over the treatment function in the relationship - the doctor is treated like a screening device, purely
mechanical in nature. See Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co., 545 A.2d 354
(Pa. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (holding no duty owed by doctor employed by an insurance
company to the plaintiff, where doctor examined the plaintiff for purposes of insurance and
failed to discover or disclose his cardiac abnormalities to him; plaintiff died a month after the
examination from his heart condition); accord, Keene v. Wiggins, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Ca. Ct.
App. 1977).
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sultation only.2" Physicians may transfer responsibility by referring
patients to other specialists. As private practitioners, they may refuse to enter into a contract with a patient, or to treat patients, even
under emergency conditions.2 9 Both physician and patient can
shape the parameters of the relationship.3" This is the essence of a
libertarian definition of professional contracting: the doctor sets the
terms and conditions, and no external constraints on bargaining and
performance exist. According to this legal summary, doctor and
patient are autonomous agents, contracting freely. While the above
principles have some support in law and practicefor the physician in
private office practice practicing fee-for-service medicine, they do
not begin to define the nature of professional medical obligations as
most physicians practice medicine.

2.

THE LIMITS OF THE CONTRACT MODEL.

Physician auton-

omy claims, as manifested in a pure contract model of health care,
are based on little more than historical accident. As Daniels writes,
"[i]t is the legacy of the fact, more visible in the U.S. than elsewhere, that physicians have been more independent of institutional
settings for the delivery of their skills than many other workers and
even than physicians in other countries."3 The defects of the contract model of the doctor-patient relationship are apparent.
First, the basis of the relationship bears little resemblance to the
economic model of arms-length dealings between a buyer and a
seller. The patient hardly consents to buy health care in the same
way he consents to buy a house or to rent instead, or chooses between a Mercedes and a Ford. He would rather skip the purchase
of health care forever, if his body would allow it. The professional
has more latitude, since he can find more clients more easily than
the patient can find professionals.3 2 The patient's interest in a
health care service is greater than that of a VCR buyer, for when
the need arises it is intense and anxiety-producing. The knowledge
disparity between doctor and patient is great, and parity in informa28. When a patient has a reasonable expectation that a physician will disclose all relevant information to him, even though no physician-patient relationship exists, then an examining physician who fails to inform a patient of abnormal test results will be liable for
resulting injury. Daly v. U.S., 946 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (Ariz. 1980) (holding physician on-call at
hospital emergency room is obligated to treat all those who come into the emergency room).
30. Clough v. Lively, 387 S.E. 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding patient declined to
enter into a physician-patient relationship any broader than necessary to accomplish the
drawing of a blood sample).
31. Daniels, supra note 15, at 123.
32. MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 64 (1981).
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tion may be unattainable, since the purchase of a health care service
cannot usually be deferred until a market analysis has been done
and comparative shopping completed. Third party payers dominate the relationship, so that any incentive by either side to bargain
based on price sensitivity is diminished or eliminated by the existence of external payers. Finally, the physician is not an independent seller, but sells within social institutions-he is both a citizen of
the institution and an agent of the purchaser-patient. He has a monopoly and the patient is neither a mobile nor an independent shopper. As one commentator observed, "[flrom this point of view, the
bargaining situation is more like that between an individual and a
33
public utility."
Second, other social forces and institutions impinge upon and
redefine the relationship: third party payment and utilization review, tort and fiduciary law standards, peer pressure within the institution, and staff privilege constraints.3 4 The contract model is
hopelessly incomplete in the complex world of health care delivery.
The terms of the contract are largely fixed in advance of any bargaining, by standard or customary practices that the physician must
follow at the risk of legal penalties. The exact nature of the work to
be done by the physician is usually left vaguely defined at best. The
relationship is closer to quasi-contract, where we impute standard
intentions and reasonable expectations to both the physician and
the patient.3 5 Professional ethics impose on physicians fiduciary obligations which courts convert into legal obligations. Courts often
look outside the parameters of contract law analysis in judging the
obligations of a physician to treat a patient, stressing that the physician's obligation to the patient, while having origins in contract, is
governed also by fiduciary obligations and other public considerations "inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling
.... "36 Doctors are not viewed as businesspeople, where self-interest is the expected norm.37 Professionals' ability to withdraw from
33. Id. at 66.
34. Id. at 26.
35. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE 63-65 (1985).

36. Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga. App. 1955) (stating that patient's action was in tort rather than in contract when doctor withdrew from case at time when wife
was in premature labor and wife delivered child while husband searched for substitute doctor). See Chatman v. Millis, 453 517 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Ark. Sup. CL 1975) (malpractice
action requires a doctor-patient relationship, a duty owed from doctor to patients, although
"[w]e do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must be predicated upon a contractual
agreement between a doctor... and patient...").
37. "It is clear from everyday observation that the behavior expected of sellers of
medical care is different from that of business people in general. These expectations
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their contracts is constrained by judicial caselaw defining patient
abandonment. 38 Implied abandonment is a negligence-based theory
judged by the overall conduct of the physician.3 9 Physicians also

lose a range of legal protections when they withhold information
from patients. Some states deem a doctor's withholding informa-

tion about his medical error to be fraud, a distinct cause of action.'
are relevant because medical care belongs to the category of commodities for which
the product and the activity of production are identical. In all such cases, the customer cannot test the product before consuming it, and there is an element of trust
in the relation. But the ethically understood restrictions on the activity of a physician are much more severe than on those of, say, a barber. His behavior is supposed
to be governed by a concern for the customer's welfare which would not be expected of a salesman. In Talcott Parsons's terms, there is a "collectivity-orientation," which distinguishes medicine and other professions from business, where selfinterest on the part of participants is the accepted norm."
Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 949 n.15 (1963). See also Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure
and The Motivation of Economic Activities; in TALcorr PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 34-68 (Free Press 1964) (1949) (stressing the role of trust in professions as
institutions).
38. As discussed supra,a doctor who withdraws from the physician-patient relationship
before a cure is achieved or the patient is transferred to the care of another may be liable for
abandonment. To escape liability, the physician must give the patient time to find alternative
care. See, e.g., Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that a cause
of action for abandonment exists where a doctor withdrew from a case while a woman was in
premature labor and a child was delivered before the husband could find a replacement
doctor).
39. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 34 N.E.2d 367 (N.Y. 1941); Ascher v.
Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235 (D.C.Cir.1976); See Leon L. McIntire, The Action ofAbandonment
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 834 (1962).
40. Negligent spoilation, based on a provider's failure to properly maintain records, or
in the extreme cases, active destruction of records, had been recognized by a few state courts.
The cause of action requires the existence of a potential civil action, a legal duty by the
defendant to preserve evidence relevant to that action, destruction of that evidence, resulting
impairment of the plaintiff's ability to prove the lawsuit, a causal relationship between the
destruction of the evidence and the impairment of the ability to sue, and damages. Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (action recognized as
generally valid in Florida, but plaintiff's claim dismissed for failure to show damage). See
generally,P. Fritz King, Spoilation: Civil LiabilityforDestruction ofEvidence, 20 U. RICH. L.
REV. 191 (1986).
The party seeking to take advantage of a defendant's fraudulent concealment has the
burden of proving that the defendant affirmatively concealed the facts upon which the cause
of action is based. As one court noted, however, "The close relationship of trust and confidence between patient and physician gives rise to duties of disclosure which may obviate the
need for a patient to prove an alfirmative act of concealment." Koppes v. Pearson, 384
N.W.2d 381, 386 (Iowa 1986).
An action for deceit requires proof that a false representation of a material fact was made,
was relied upon by the patient in ignorance, and damage resulted. The representation must
be fraudulently made, since an intention to deceive by the physician is needed. See Harris v.
Penninger, 613 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo. App. 1981) (dismissing cause of action based on fraud
where plaintiff had failed to assert a claim for damages resulting from the fraud). In Hart v.
Browne, 163 Cal. Rptr. 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), a physician was sued for fraud when he
advised the lawyer for a surgeon's patient that the surgeon's conduct was not negligent, when
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The omission also tolls the statute of limitations in a malpractice
suit by the patient against that doctor.4 1 An informed consent
cause of action is based on failure to disclose information.42 Some
newer cases are also based on a claim for a breach of a physician's
fiduciary duty to disclose conflicts of interest.4 3 The environment of
providers is bounded by legal constraints and specific role
requirements.
An express written contract is rarely drafted for specific physician-patient interactions. An implied contract is usually the basis of
the relationship between a physician and a patient. 44 A physician
who talks with a patient by telephone may be held to have an implied contractual obligation to that patient.4 5 Likewise, a physician
such as a pathologist, who renders services to a patient but has not
the records he had examined in fact showed abundant negligence. See also Henry v. Deen,
310 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1984) (allowing a theory of civil conspiracy and a punitive damages
claim); Kreuger v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1981) (allowing a fraud claim
based upon the physician's false representations.)
Some commentators have advocated a major development of these few cases into a new
duty to disclose, requiring negligent health care providers to confess their negligence to the
patients injured by it. See Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians'
Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 52 (1980) (advocating a duty to disclose malpractice to the patient); Theodore R. LeBlang & Jane L. King, Tort Liability for
Nondisclosure: The Physician's Legal Obligations to Disclose Patient Illness and Injury, 89
DICK. L. REv. 1 (1984) (suggesting the fiduciary relationship creates a duty to disclose information concerning the patient's physical condition).
41. Sea e.g., Mastro v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1984) (defining "discovery of injury" for purposes of tolling statute of limitations).
42. See generally Furrow, supra note 13 at 338-39 (providing a list of items a physician
should consider disclosing: a) diagnosis; b) the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment;
c) the risks of treatment; d) the probability of success; and e) treatment alternatives).
43. See discussion of Moore infra § I(b)(3).
44. When a patient goes to a doctor's office with a particular problem, he is offering to
enter into a contract with the physician. When the physician examines the patient, she accepts the offer and an implied contract is created. The physician is free to reject the offer and
send the patient away, relieving herself of any duty to that patient. See, e.g., Childs v. Weis,
440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (holding that a physician has no duty to treat where
there is no express or implied contract creating a physician-patient relationship). Some
courts state as a starting principle that:
[a]s a practical matter, health professionals cannot be required to obtain express
consent before each touch or test they perform on a patient. Consent may be express or implied; implied consent may be inferred from the patient's action of seeking treatment or some other act manifesting a willingness to submit to a particular
course of treatment.
Jones v. Malloy, 412 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Neb. 1987) citing Banks v. Wittenberg, 266 N.W. 2d
788 (Mich Ct. App. 1978).
45. See Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hosp., 557 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1990) (holding that a telephone call for purposes of initiating treatment may create a physician-patient relationship);
O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (holding that a jury question of
negligence exists when patient was refused treatment following a telephone conversation with
physician).
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contracted with him, is nonetheless bound by certain implied contractual obligations. These implied obligations become part of the

professional role, defined by the courts through a variety of rationales. Courts have held that workplace examinations of employees

may create physician obligations to the examined person, even
though he is not defined as a "patient". 46 These maintenance examinations in the workplace go beyond screening for other purposes,
such as insurance, and the courts have found a duty to diagnose and

inform. 47 The entanglement of the doctor with a quasi-patient has
increased. One explanation could be the expectation of the employee with regard to his employer's obligations to him.48

Once the physician-patient relationship has been created, physicians are subject to a range of obligations. They must give the pa-

tient "continuing attention. 'a9 Termination of the physicianpatient relationship, once created, is subject in some jurisdictions to
a "continuous treatment" rule to determine when the statute of lim-

itations is tolled. Treatment obligations cease only if the physician
can do nothing more for the patient, or if the physician ceases to
attend the patient.50 A physician who withdraws from the physician-patient relationship before the patient is cured or transferred to
another's care may be liable for abandonment.5 1 The tort doctrine
46. Daly v. Unites States, 946 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that under Washington law, a physician had a duty to disclose abnormal test results even if no physician-patient
relationship exists).
47. See e.g., Cofee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (1972) Plaintiff applied
for a job as a pilot with the defendant aircraft manufacturer; as part of his physical, he was
given a blood test, with the results received by a secretary at defendant's medical clinic, timestamped, and filed. No doctor reviewed the result, which would have led to a diagnosis of
cancer of the bone marrow. The court held that the company was negligent in its failure to
establish a proper procedure for evaluation of blood test reports.
48. In Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1990), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, interpreting Louisiana law in a diversity action, held that the physician-patient
relationship should be expanded to include employees examined by a company physician for
employment purposes. The court held that:
This relationship imposes upon the examining physician a duty to conduct the requested tests and diagnose the results thereof, exercising the level of care consistent
with the doctor's professional training and expertise, and to take reasonable steps to
make information available timely to the examinee of any findings that pose an
imminent danger to the examinee's physical or mental well-being.
Id. at 296.
49. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937) (holding that the obligation of
continuing attention may be terminated only when the case no longer requires attention).
50. See Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that treatment
ceases when a physician stops attending to the patient). Cf., Wells v. Billars, 391 N.W.2d 668
(S.D. 1986) (holding that an optometrist's duty continued to date when patient visited clinic
to take delivery of glasses).
51. See Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E. 2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).
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of abandonment presumes an improper attempt by the physician to

extricate herself from this contract, to the patient's detriment. It
can be invoked by a patient-plaintiff whenever a treating physician

has severed the physician-patient relationship without giving the patient a reasonable time or the opportunity to secure another equally

qualified physician, and the patient then suffers injury because of
delay in treatment or lack of further treatment.52 To avoid liability,
the physician generally is required to give the patient time to find
other care.5 3 A negligence-based theory, abandonment is judged by

the overall conduct of the physician.54 While contract rules may
guide the formation of a physician-patient relationship, termination
of that relationship absent explicit mutual consent is evaluated by

standards of reasonableness.
A duty of "necessary rescue" is imposed by the courts in situa-

tions where a person would be left helpless if the professional refuses to help.55 The physician's right to unilaterally terminate
treatment is thus particularly circumscribed in emergency situa-

tions, defined as situations where the patient has a "critical need"
for that physician's attention. A provider can be "conscripted" to

rescue through webs of obligation created by emergency situations.
In Urrutia v. Patino,5 6 the court stated that "a physician is never
justified in withdrawing from a case that he has once undertaken at
a criticalstage when his replacementcannot be supplied." [emphasis
52. See Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W. 2d 676, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that "There must be evidence that the physician has terminated the relationship at a
critical stage of the patient's treatment, that the termination was done without reason or
sufficient notice to enable the patient to procure another physician, and that the patient is
injured as a result thereof.") See also Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E. 2d 103 (Va. 1977) (holding
that a physician may withdraw from the case only when the patient has reasonable opportunity to acquire needed services from another physician).
53. See Norton v. Hamilton supra note 38.
54. Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (setting out proper types of
evidence for abandonment cases); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp, 34 N.E. 2d 367 (N.Y.
1941) (setting out the types of evidence permissible in cases of physician abandonment);
Leon M. McIntire, The Action ofAbandonment in Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 36 TUL. L.
REv. 834 (1962) (discussing how the extent and scope of the physician-patient relationship
determine duties and obligations).
55. "[A] professional ought to be held morally and professionally (if not necessarily
legally) responsible to provide assistance in any situation in which, if he did not, someone
would be left helpless. Consider the case of the only doctor in an isolated frontier town.
Surely he should not be entitled to withdraw from the case of someone too ill to be moved, no
matter how much notice he gives of this intention to do so. Neither should he be entitled to
refuse to treat that patient in the first place." Goodin, supra note 35, at 67. See also Robert
Justin Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritansand MoralMonsters: An IndividualisticJustification
of the GeneralLegal Duty to Rescue, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 252 (1983).
56. 297 S.W. 512, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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added]. These constraints--critical need for treatment and unavailability or lack of time to secure a replacement-define a situation considerably broader than the normal "emergency" situation.
In a nonemergency situation, the original physician need not
physically replace herself with another physician before withdrawing in order to avoid a tort suit for abandonment.5 7 Yet the physician must give the patient a list of possible alternative physicians to
handle the patient's condition. Suppose, however, that the physician is the only specialist within the relevant geographic area, as
measured by the expense or difficulty experienced by a patient when
traveling to consult with another specialist. Must the physician
continue to treat when the only other available specialist requires
the patient to incur large transportation costs, so that the referring
physician is essentially unavailable to the patient? The patient may
have a critical need for treatment, with alternative care unavailable
in any practical sense.
A continuing treatment obligation imposed on physicians
against their wishes must withstand several arguments. First, given
physician antipathy, forcing a continuation of the physician-patient
relationship against the physician's wishes hardly achieves the idealized model of the physician-patient relationship. It is even arguable
that the physician might render bad care unconsciously, if not consciously, because of this anger. However, this argument overstates
the problem. Physician antipathy must be counterbalanced by patient needs and a realization that the professional role carries with it
continuing obligations. Lack of payment by the patient is one area
in which there is an analogous body of caselaw that imposes an
obligation on physicians even when physicians feel hostile to the
patient. The caselaw has consistently declared that the failure of
the patient to pay for the physician's services will not justify unilateral termination of the physician-patient relationship so long as the
patient still needs medical attendance. 5 9 These cases often involve
emergency situations where the physician has not taken steps in ad57. Miller v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 508 A.2d 927, 931 (D.C.C.A. 1986).
See also Wyatt v. Ford, 363 S.E. 2d 866 (Ct. App. Ga. 1987) (trial court had denied physician's motion for summary judgment, court held that the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted).
58. Id. (holding "[w]here a patient is not in need of immediate medical attention, supplying the patient with a list of substitute physicians to replace the attending physician is a
reasonable means of severing the professional relationship.") In this regard, direct provision
of another colleague to cover the patient is sufficient to relieve the physician of further obligations to the patient.
59. See Ricks v. Budge, supra note 49.
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vance to warn the patient of the termination and to find him an
alternate provider, and the patient could, therefore, be said to have
a legitimate expectancy of a continuing relationship.
Second, it may be argued that such a rule will create perverse
obligations for physicians practicing in rural areas. The courts have
not faced a situation where substantial travel costs, or even impossibility of access, may result from the remoteness of referral physicians. The rural setting involves a special case of expectations:
citizen expectations that a physician who chose to relocate in their
area will be available to them within reason, and the physician's
expectation that he will have to provide care when needed, given
the lack of backup in such areas. While a government subsidy or
some kind of special program might be useful,' it does not seem
unreasonable to obligate a physician to treat patients within his
realm of expertise, particulary in emergency situations. Goodin argues for a collective duty on the medical profession to a patient, to
be provided by a particular doctor who is "linked"-selected out of
the general pool of professionals-by a promise, a contract, or the
fiduciary bonds of a health care system. 6t According to Goodin, "it
is vulnerability, however engendered, that plays the crucial role in
'62
generating special responsibilities.

3.

THE COVENANT TO SERVE.

The implied contract expecta-

tions imposed by the courts suggest a much broader definition of
role obligations in forced rescue contexts. May offers the model of a
covenant as a basis for health care, rejecting contract, code, and
philanthropy as alternatives.6 3 Medical codes embody the ideal of
philanthropy, that is, dedication to the service of mankind. Such
codes succumb to what May calls "the conceit of philanthropy",
which assumes "that the professional's commitment to his fellow60. A special program has existed to subsidize a student's medical education in exchange for a certain number of years of service. The National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program was established by Congress to address the maldistribution of health care
manpower in the U.S. 42 U.S.C. § 254d (1988) (National Health Service Corps). Eligible
students in professional health degree programs receive scholarships that cover their educational expenses and include a stipend for living expenses. U.S.C. § 2541 (1988) (National
Health Service Corps Scholarship Program). In exchange the student agrees to serve "in a
health manpower shortage area" to which he is assigned by the Secretary. 42 U.S. § 254d(a)
and 254e (1988). See also Rendlemen v. Sullivan, 760 F. Supp. 842 (D. Or. 1991) (holding
failure to serve in area gives government right to seek repayment, but doctor's actions in
starting a homeless clinic should be considered by DHHS as to whether it would make enforcement of his payment obligation unconscionable).
61. Goodin, supra note 33, at 126.
62. Id.
63. William F. May, Code, Covenant, Contract, or Philanthropy, 5 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1975, at 29.
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man is a gratuitous, rather than a responsive or reciprocal, act.""
It is a model of a profession owing no duties to patients except those
self chosen, much like the contract model. The contract view is also
too limited; as May argues, "[tihe kind of minimalism encouraged
by a contractualist understanding of the professional relationship
produces a professional too grudging, too calculating, too lacking in
spontaneity, too quickly exhausted to go the second mile with his
patients along the road of their distress."6 5
A covenant, by contrast, is an agreement between parties, a reciprocal relationship based on a gift between partners, and a covenant is a promise based on this original exchange of gifts, labors or
services. This historic promissory event then defines future obligations. In medicine, the liberal state defines the obligations of this
convenant, since the professions exist with the consent of the state
and for its benefit.66 The physician owes a debt to the community.
He owes some group for his education, since the social investment
in medicine is large. He was selected for medical school while
others were not. He receives an "extraordinary social largess" in
exchange for his services.6 7 He learned on patients as a beginner,
receiving a further subsidy through risk-taking. And he is in the
debt of patients treated during his career for his existence and his
ability to perform his trade competently. The relationship is therefore marked by elements of exchange and reciprocity. It is bounded
by contractual protections, but more is required by the medical covenant and by the social definition of the professional role.6 8
64. IdL at 32.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Bayles, supra note 32, at 11-12 (discussing TROYEN BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING:
MEDICAL ETHIcs INTHE LIBERAL STATE (1991)). Brennan wants physicians to have a pri-

mary role, in contrast to Bayles' view, with medical ethics defined as a set of evolving principles by physicians and other members of the liberal state.
67. May, supra note 63, at 32.
68. May writes:
But the contractualist approach to professional behavior falls into the opposite error
of minimalism. It reduces everything to tit-for-tat: do no more for your patients
than what the contract calls for perform specified services for certain fees and no
more, ... , But it would be wrong to reduce professional obligation to the specifics
of a contract alone,... Professional services in the so called helping professions are
directed to subjects who are in the nature of the case rather unpredictable. One
deals with the sickness, ills, crimes, needs, and tragedies of humankind. These
needs cannot be exhaustively specified in advance for each patient or client. The
professions must be ready to cope with the contingent, the unexpected. Calls upon
services may be required that exceed those anticipated in a contract or for which
compensation may be available in a given case.
Id. at 34.
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B. Affirmative Obligations On Physicians
A landscape of affirmative obligations, broadly defined, is constructed out of a wide spectrum of legal doctrines. A moral detective finds a legal landscape dotted with eruptions of principles that
redefine medical and fiduciary obligations, demanding that providers "rescue" someone in distress. Some doctrines stretch the
boundaries of contractual relationships by requiring additional burdens on the provider or creating the fiction of a contract.
1. RESCUING PATIENTS FROM THEIR OWN IGNORANCE.
Basic informed consent doctrine in tort law requires physicians to disclose to patients all information necessary to their health care
decisionmaking. 9 A patient must make an informed choice, that is,
must be rescued from his own ignorance about courses of treatment.
A physician must disclose to the patient not only the consequences
of treatment, but also of inaction. In Truman v. Thomas,7 0 Dr.
Thomas failed to explain to his patient, Rena Truman, the consequences of her persistent refusal to undergo a Pap smear. Dr. Truman saw her as a patient for five years, and often said to her, "You
should have a Pap smear."71 She always declined, either not wanting to pay for it or simply not wanting to undergo any more tests.
Dr. Thomas is quoted as saying, "We are not enforcers, we are advisors," in justifying his failure to explain the purpose of the test and
the consequences of cervical cancer.7 2 The California Supreme
Court held that a physician has a duty to disclose to a patient the
consequences of a failure to undergo a test or procedure viewed as
valuable by a doctor. "If a patient indicates that he or she is going
to decline the risk-free test or treatment, then the doctor has the additional duty of advising of all material risks of which a reasonable
person would want to be informed before deciding not to undergo the
procedure" (emphasis added).7 3
This "right to an informed refusal" demands that the doctor
rescue the patient from her ignorance about choices, in an attempt
to ensure that a future bad result is either avoided or the tradeoff is
explicitly made by the patient. It requires that the doctor spend a
69. See Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. 1960) (holding doctors owed patient
the duty to inform him generally of the possible serious collateral hazards of insulin treatment); and Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (holding radiologist was
obligated to make a reasonable disclosure to patient of nature and probable consequences of
radiation treatment).
70. 611 P.2d 902 (S.C. Cal. 1980).
71. Id. at 906.
72. Id.

73. Id
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valuable commodity-time-in order to maximize the patient's
choices. The doctor controls information otherwise unavailable to
patients; from this control flows an obligation to use that information to help patients avoid medical hazards and even to help a patient preserve a tort right to sue the physician.7 4
2. RESCUING THIRD PARTIES FROM EXPOSURE TO RISKS. An
example of the extension of physician obligations to those not in a
contractual relationship with them is found in caselaw that requires
a warning to third parties. What if doctors have information about
a patient which, if disclosed, might prevent harm to others? Requirements of confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship
militate against disclosure generally, and disclosure may even expose the physician to potential liability. However, physicians and
other health professionals have an affirmative obligation to protect
third parties against hazards created by their patients. In DiMarco
v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, 5 the sexual partner of a patient
sued the patient's physicians, who had assured her that she would
not contract hepatitis. The patient-plaintiff Janet Viscichini, a
blood technician, went to the Lynch Home to take a blood sample
from one of the residents. During the procedure, her skin was accidentally punctured by the needle she had used to extract blood.
When she learned that the patient had hepatitis, she sought treatment from Doctors Giunta and Alwine. They told her that if she
remained symptom-free for six weeks, she would not be infected by
the hepatitis virus. She was not told to refrain from sexual relations
for any period of time following her exposure to the disease, but she
practiced sexual abstinence until eight weeks after the exposure.
Since she had remained symptom-free during that time, she then
resumed sexual relations with the plaintiff. She was later diagnosed
as suffering from hepatitis B in September; in December, the plaintiff was similarly diagnosed.
The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A,
which provided, in part, that one who provides services to another
may be liable to a third person for harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care, if "the harm is suffered because of reliance
of the other or the third person upon the undertaking." 76 The court
allowed the action, concluding that the class of persons at risk included any one who is physically intimate with the patient.
When a physician treats a patient who has been exposed to or
74. See case cited supra note 38.
75. 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990).
76. Id. at 424.
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who has contracted a communicable and/or contagious disease,
it is imperative that the physician give his or her patient the
proper advice about preventing the spread of the disease ....
Physicians are the first line of defense against the spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know what measures
must be taken to prevent the infection of others.77
Contagious diseases are thus a consistent example of a physi-

cian's duty to disclose risk of real or potential harm or protect
others who might be exposed to the risks of disease or infection.
Physicians are conscripted into rescue; in the court's words, they
"are the first line of defense."'78 Physicians have been held liable for
failing to warn the daughter of a patient with scarlet fever, a wife
about the danger of infection from a patient's wounds, a neighbor
about a patient's smallpox. 7 9 Family members are foreseeable third

parties, as are neighbors."0 DiMarco clearly applies to the risk of
contagion from the HIV virus, requiring that physicians be aware of

the nature of the HIV virus, its modes of transmission, and the kind
of counseling that AIDS necessitates.
Another line of cases imposes a duty on a physician to protect
unknown third parties against medication side-effects that their patients might experience,"1 and to warn third parties of dangers
77. Id. at 424. See also Shephard v. Redford Community Hospital, 390 N.W. 2d 239
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a duty was owed to child of carrier of contageous disease
to properly warn of the danger of transmitting disease to a child).
78. Id.
79. Lemmon v. Freese, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (epilepsy); and Jones v. Stanko,
160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (smallpox).
80. Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W. 2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (holding physician may be liable
for negligence in not diagnosing epilepsy in patient for injury later caused to third party
because of patient's epileptic seizure); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (holding
physician liable for failure to warn persons in close proximity to patient that patients has
infectious smallpox). See Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (N.H. 1919) (physician liable for
negligently advising plaintiff's wife that daughter's scarlet fever was not infectious); Edwards
v. Lamb, 45 A.480 (1899) (surgeon liable for negligently assuring plaintiff that there was no
danger of infection when plaintiff assisted surgeon in addressing plaintiff's husband's wound).
See generally Bruce A. McDonald, Ethical Problemsfor PhysiciansRaised by AIDS and HIV
Infection: Conflicting Legal Obligations of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U. C. DAVIS
L.REv. 557 (1989).
81. Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 N.W. 2d 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). Welke is part of a line of
case law requiring physicians to warn third parties about, or take steps to protect them from,
patients who are taking medication. These steps might include warning the patient about the
effects of medication, or even refusing to prescribe the medication if the patient might still
drive. See Meyers v. Quesenberry, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (physician failed
to warn his patient, a diabetic, of the dangers of driving); Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (physician failed to warn the patient of the dangers of driving while
taking tranquilizers); Watkins v. United States, 589 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (negligence to
prescribe Valium to mentally ill patient); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973)
(doctor found liable for failure to warn the patient about the risk of a sudden seizure, and the
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posed by psychiatric patients.8 2

3.

RESCUING PATIENTS FROM DOCTORS:

DISCLOSING CON-

FLICTS OF INTEREST. The limits of a contract model for the doctorpatient relationship are further revealed by duties imposed by the
courts to disclose conflicts of interest between the patient's best interests and a physician's interest in fame and fortune. Patients are
vulnerable, and this vulnerability imposes on physicians a "trust", a
fiduciary obligation justified by the physician's dominant position in
the relationship. Economic conflicts of interest have been the focus
of recent cases that use fiduciary concepts to define physician duties
to disclose possible conflicts of interest or other information important to a patient in assessing physician motivations.
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,83 the plaintiff
John Moore (hereinafter Moore) underwent treatment for hairy-cell
leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California at
Los Angeles (hereinafter UCLA Medical Center). Moore first visited UCLA Medical Center shortly after he learned that he had
hairy-cell leukemia. His physician Dr. Golde hospitalized Moore
and withdrew blood and bone marrow aspirate. Dr. Golde failed to
disclose his preexisting research and economic interests in the cells
before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which they
were extracted. The defendants, including Dr. Golde, were aware
that Moore's cell line was of great commercial value.
The court characterized the cause of action as either a breach of
fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to a patient's consent, or in
the alternative, as the performance of medical procedures without
the patient's consent.
[A] physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research interest has potentially conflicting loyalties. This is because medical treatment decisions are made on the basis of
proportionality-weighing the benefits to the patient against the
patient then drove into the plaintiff during a fainting spell); Kaiser v. Suburban Transport.
Sys., 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965) amended, 401 P.2d 350 (Wash. 1965) (doctor prescribed a
drug for a patient, a bus driver, but neglected to tell him that it might make him sleepy;
doctor held liable to the bus passengers and other third persons who were harmed when the
driver fell asleep at the wheel).
82. Davis v. Lhim, 335 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), remanded 422 Mich. 875
(1985) (held that a psychiatrist owes a professional duty of care to those who could be
foreseeably injured by his patient). This obligation has first appeared in the psychiatric context, beginning with Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334
(1976). See also McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super 1979); Hedlund v. Superior
Court of Orange County, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497
F.Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
83. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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risks to the patient .... [A] physician who adds his own research
interests to this balance may be tempted to order a scientifically
useful procedure or test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to
the patient. The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has affected the physician's judgment is something
that a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding
whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment. It is material to the
patient's decision and, thus, a prerequisite to informed
84
consent

In Moore, the court explicitly used both fiduciary duty and informed consent doctrine in order to impose an obligation on the
physicians to disclose their research and economic interests.85 The
tension in the fiduciary disclosure cases is tangible-a physician
must rescue a patient from the physician's own mixed motivations
and conflicts of interest between the patient's good and his own.
The rescuer and the person posing a danger are folded into the same
person.
C.

Bribed Rescue

Physicians often seem to need encouragement to be Good Samaritans. Hesitant to force rescue, state legislatures have enacted
Good Samaritan Laws to encourage rescue by quieting physician
84. Id. at 484.
85. Physicians may at times want to try a new or innovative approach to a patient's
problems. In Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E. 2d 240 (N.C. App. 1984), the plaintiff Estrada's
physicians neglected to tell him that the procedure they were trying on him was experimental,
an innovation on him that they hoped to study.
The psychology of the doctor-patient relation, and the rewards, financial and professional, attendant upon recognition of experimental success, increase the potential
for abuse and strengthen the rationale for uniform disclosure... Accordingly, we
reaffirm our holding that reasonable standards of informed consent to an experimental procedure require disclosure to the patient that the procedure is
experimental.
Id. at 255.
See generally on fiduciary obligations, Maxwell J. Mehiman, FiduciaryContracting:Limitations on BargainingBetween Patientsand Health Care Providers, 51 U. PrT. L. REV. 365
(1990); Marc. A. Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest" The Limitations ofDisclosure, 321
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405 (1989); Thomas Boyd, Cost Containmentand the Physician'sFiduciary Duty to the Patient, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 131 (1989); EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO &
DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 260 (1981); Ste-

phen R. Feldman & Thomas M. Ward, PsychotherapeuticInjury: Reshaping the Implied
Contract as an Alternative to Malpractice, 58 N.C. L. REV. 63 (1979).
Many of the cases use the language of fiduciary obligations in discussing informed consent. See Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1979) (physician's fiduciary duty is to
obtain patient's informed consent); Ostojic v. Brueckmann, 405 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1968)
(existence of physician' fiduciary duty requires full disclosure); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488
F. Supp. 181, 207 (E.D. La. 1980) (holding "informed consent involves the fiduciary nature
of the doctor patient-relationship ... ").
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anxiety about lawsuits. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted Good Samaritan legislation to protect health
care professionals who render emergency aid from civil liability for
damages for any injury they cause or enhance in rendering such
emergency aid.8 6 The statutes take a variety of forms.87 Some statutes protect health care professionals, while others protect all Good
Samaritans, without regard to their profession.8 8 Some states grant

statutory immunity from suit to emergency medical personnel unless gross negligence is shown. 89 The majority of state statutes exclude medical services rendered in the hospital from the coverage of

the statutes, either by excluding emergency services provided in the
ordinary course of work or services that doctors render to those
with whom they have a doctor-patient relationship or to whom they
owe a preexisting duty.' Hospital-based emergency assistance by a

physician is often protected, however, where the physician is not on
duty at the time of the call for help. 91
The purpose of Good Samaritan statutes is to encourage physicians and other providers to offer emergency aid, by eliminating
their largely unfounded fears of malpractice suits for any negligent

harm they might cause a victim that they rescue. 92 This reduced
standard of care for medical rescuers strikes a balance between pe86. In McCain v. Batson, 760 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1988), a physician on vacation sutured a
hiker's wound at his condominium, using limited medical supplies on hand. The court held
that this was an "emergency" within the meaning of the statute.
87. CAL.Bus. & PROF.CODE § 2395 (West 1990), for example, states, in relevant part,
"No licensee, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency,
shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in
rendering the emergency care."
"The scene of an emergency" as used in this section shall include, but not be limited to,
the emergency rooms of hospitals in the event of a medical disaster.
88. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1992) ("Any person... who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment.. ."); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 258A § 9 (West 1988) ("No person who in good faith.. ."), OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.23 (Anderson 1991) ("No person shall be iable.. for administering emergency
care or treatment...").
89. Mallory v. City of Detroit, 449 N.W.2d 115 (1989) (upholding grant of statutory
immunity as long as act or omission of emergency medical personnel is not the result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct). See generally W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Construction of
Good Samaritan'Statutes Excusing from Civil Liability One Rendering Care in Emergency,
39 A.L.R. 3d 222 (1971).
90. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975) (statute not
applicable to services in hospital); Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (normal course of practice not protected); Gragg v. Neurological Associates, 263
S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (crisis during operating procedure is not emergency within
meaning of statute).
91. See Gordin v. William Beaumont Hospital, 447 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
92. For an interesting discussion of the duty to rescue, see Saul Levmore, Waiting for
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nalizing the hasty physician caught in an unexpected treatment setting and promoting risk-free additional rescues.9 3 Some states have
gone further by providing indigent care immunities, extending
Good Samaritan immunity beyond emergencies to the treatment of
the indigent generally, especially Medicaid patients.9 4 Some states
have considered implementing tort immunity for physicians who
treat the indigent. 95
II.

PHYSICIANS IN INSTITUTIONS:
THROWING OUT LIFELINES

Ethical and legal discussions tend to focus on the individual
physician and her obligations to her patients, whether by agreement
or externally expanded by courts and fiduciary concepts. But most
health care is delivered by physicians within institutional
frameworks - hospitals, health maintenance organizations (hereinafter HMO), group practices. Physicians who practice in institutions, either as employees or members of the medical staff, must
provide health care within the limits of the health plan's coverage or
their employment contracts with the institution. In this case, the
contact between the physician and the patient is preceded by an
express contract spelling out the details of the relationship. Physicians who are members of a health maintenance organization have a
duty to treat plan members, as part of their contractual obligation
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879 (1986).
93. MARSHALL SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY 28
(1977).
94. See American Medical Association, 16 State Health Legislation Report (May 1988).
See also ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-571 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (West Supp.
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (Michie Supp. 1992); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 4404
(Smith-Hurd 1978); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2904 (West 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3355-210 (Law Co-op. 1977); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-225 to 8.01-225.1 (Michie 1992).
95. While the threat that a poor patient will sue a physician is quite low, Molly McNulty, Are PoorPatientsLikely to Sue for Malpractice?,262 JAMA 1391 (1980); Sara Rosenbaum & Dana Hughes, The Medical Malpractice Crisis and Poor Women, in PRENATAL
CARE, REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS (1988), the concept of a mandate for free
care at some level in exchange for the tort subsidy is a direct step beyond the Good Samaritan
statutes, which simply hope for more provider willingness to help someone in distress in
exchange for a qualified immunity from suit. The District of Columbia has amended its
Good Samaritan Act to provide immunity for volunteer physicians, nurse-midwives and
nurses providing obstetrical care. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1345 (Supp. 1992). For a discussion
and critique of this act, see generally Bridget A. Burke, Using GoodSamaritanActs to Provide
Access to Health Carefor the Poor: A Modest Proposal, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139 (1992).
This emphasis on volunteerism in exchange for tort immunity raises troubling questions. It is
not particularly fair to force the indigent as a group to trade off their right to sue, with its
deterrence potential in exchange for care.
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to the HMO. The express contracts are between the physician and
the HMO, and the subscriber and the HMO, with an implied con-

tract between the subscriber and the treating physician. 9 6 Members
of a hospital staff may also be expressly bound to treat patients,
particularly in the emergency room when they are on call. 97 They
have waived their rights to refuse to treat particular patients, as a
result of their contractual obligations to the hospital. Contractual
obligations flow from the employment setting, binding physicians to

treat individual subscribers. 98 Professional autonomy is traded for
the security of income stability.

The traditional malpractice standard of care applies to hospitals
and to individual physicians. Malpractice is usually defined as unskillful practice resulting in injury to the patient, a failure to exercise the "required degree of care, skill and diligence" under the
circumstances. 99 A physician is not a guarantor of good results, nor
is he required to exercise the highest degree of care possible. However, modem courts grant less leeway to providers than in the past,

for example, rejecting "error in judgment" instructions as unduly
favorable to defendants. 10°
The standard of care by which the conduct of providers is mea-

sured is a national one, requiring the provider to render care consistent with a reasonable level of medical skill and knowledge, based

on the adept use of available medical facilities and equipment. 101
Most courts also allow evidence describing the practice limitations
under which the defendant labors."1
96. See generally Louis D. Rodgers et. al., The HMO Contract and Quality of Care, 78
IOWA MED. 466 (1988); Comment, ContractualTheories of Recovery in the HMO Provider
-Subscriber Relationship: Prospective Litigationfor Breach of Contract, 36 BuFF. L. REv.
119, 124-25 (1987).
97. Hiser, supra note 29.
98. The traditional scope of the contractual relationship may even include obligations
such as completing benefit forms for a patient. See Chew v. Meyer, 527 A.2d 828 (Mich App.
1987) (recognizing a cause of action in negligence where a physician's failure to complete
plaintiff's insurance form led to plaintiff losing a job).
99. Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970) (holding negligence can be
found from the fact that the accident itself occurred where an injection renders a patient
partially paralyzed).
100. See Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Vt. 1989) (rejecting "error in judgement"
instruction in medical malpractice action due to ambiguous language and subjectivity).
101. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (S.C. Miss. 1985) (allowing expert testimony from
other localities to be entered into the record to help determine national standard in malpractice action).
102. Id. at 972. Hall's "resource component" allows the trier of fact to consider the facilities, staff and other equipment available to the practitioner in the institution, following the
general rule that courts should take into account the locality, proximity of specialists and
special facilities for diagnosis and treatment. See also Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373
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The law has imposed obligations on physicians, often when they
have done something to create reliance or a generalized sense of
security.l" 3 A judicial move from contract to negligence is typically
most evident in emergency settings, particularly in hospitals, as
courts search for a nexus between doctor and individual in crisis. A
case illustrates the point. In Noble v. Sartori,'0 ' two brothers took
their third brother, Amel, who was having a "heart attack", to the
emergency room at Knox County General. One brother went to
Dr. Sartori, who was dressed "like a doctor" in a white coat, with a
stethoscope around his neck. He pleaded with the doctor three
times to help his brother. Dr. Sartori did not help, but told him to
get in line and sign in. They then left and drove to another hospital;
the next day Amel died. Dr. Sartori argued that he had not agreed
to treat the patient, so no physician-patient relationship existed.
The court noted that it was an emergency situation, the physician
was obviously a staff physician, and he told the brother to get in line
three times. The court however went beyond this: "[T]he question
here becomes whether the actions of the physician were negligent in
the circumstances, and if so, whether the jury could infer what he
did was a substantial factor contributing to Noble's death." 10 5 Dr.
Sartori was the only doctor on duty who could have handled the
problem, and he was available. The court quoted Rockhill v. Pollard,10 6 to the effect that "a physician who is consulted in an emergency has a duty to respect that interest, at least to the extent of
making a good-faith attempt to provide adequate treatment or advice."" The court in Noble then seemed to define a utilitarian duty
to rescue where it was efficient to do so, even if no contract existed
(Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing standard of care to "include elements of locality, availability of
facilities, specialization in general practice, proximity of specialist and special facilities as well
as other relevant consideration."); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 299A, Comment g.
('Allowance must be made also for the type of community in which the actor carries on his
practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have the equipment, facilities, experience,
knowledge or opportunity to obtain it, afforded him by a large city.")
103. See Shapo, supra note 103, at pt. 1 (discussing methods by which a power holder
may engender reliance on the part of the injured party).
Often the solution for a particular case will depend principally on the fact that a
power holder already has done something in a way that engenders reliance on the
part of the injured party or has created a generalized sense of security with reference to the latter's physical integrity.

Id. at 4.
104. 799 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1990).
105. Id. at 4.
106. 485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971) (holding that in order to ensure physician liability, plaintiff
must show physician's conduct was outrageous in the extreme and that he suffered emotional
distress as a result).
107. Id. at 63.
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or could be constructed: "Thus, although we recognize that in the
usual situation a doctor is under no obligation to treat a person, we
also recognize [that] the law implies a duty wherever circumstances
put parties in a relationship to each other where when one acts negligently and it causes injury to the other."1'0 This sounds like a
judicial summary of a vulnerable plaintiff, susceptible to a physician's failure to act.1°9 It was an emergency rescue, and the physician's refusal to act breached his legal obligation to rescue the
vulnerable plaintiff. The plaintiffs had expectations as to the doctor's treatment of the ill brother; by agreeing to serve in the hospital
emergency room the physician had traded some autonomy for income. The web of obligations entangled Dr. Sartori fairly.
The myth of the independent and freely contracting physician
has thus been undermined in many ways. The courts have been
willing to stretch contract and fiduciary principles to snag physicians and impose obligations on them. Courts have also imposed
duties on physicians to "rescue" patients and third parties-from
their own ignorance, from external risks, from the physician's own
conflicts of interest.
The complexity of reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid and the multiple sources of funding for patient care have
pushed courts toward imposing new duties to rescue on providers.
As physicians increasingly practice within managed care
frameworks and under utilization review constraints in hospitals,
they have an emerging duty to learn how the reimbursement mechanisms work.
One emerging duty to rescue is the obligation to throw a financial lifeline to a patient. A physician may have a duty to assist patients in obtaining payment for health care.1 10 This is an obligation
of financial rescue, using insider information to open channels of
reimbursement for a patient in a crisis. At a minimum, this means
that the doctor must be aware of reimbursement constraints so that
he can promptly advise the patient or direct him to an appropriate
institutional office for further information. Federal and state payment systems are designed to control healthcare cost inflation.
Medicare's prospective payment system, the Diagnosis-Related
Groups (hereinafter DRG) system, approved in 1982 by Congress,
108. Noble, supra note 104, at 9-10.

109. See also Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (1978) (examining what constitutes an emergency situation which may render a physician or hospital

liable for failing to treat a patient); and

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

110. See discussion of Wickline, Wilson, and other case infra.

§ 323 (1965).
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creates a complex administered price system for hospital services.I"
Many states also have implemented prospective payment hospital
reimbursement systems," 2 and private insurers are also piggy-backing on the system.11 3 Such approaches, aimed at controlling escalating health care costs, create tensions between cost control and
quality of care. The pressure is to reduce diagnostic tests, control
lengths of stay in hospitals, and trim the fat out of medical
1 14
practice.

Physicians have affirmative obligations to treat their patients in
conformity with recognized standards of care, to inform them of the
risks of treatments, and to advise them of conflicts of interest. But

must a physician actively assist a patient in obtaining funding for a
procedure that the physician feels is necessary? No court would
require a physician to pay out of his own pocket for a treatment

that a patient needs-there is no "duty to rescue" in the sense of a
physician's financial obligation to support his patient. 5 However,
Wickline and other cases may support the argument that a physician operating within a reimbursement structure and bureaucracy is
expected to be familiar with the mechanisms of payment.
A.

The Duty to Understand Reimbursement: Wickline

Wickline v. State'1 6 considered physician obligations to use their
special position to rescue patients from reimbursement limits. The
case involved the release of a patient from the hospital post-operatively in less time than the treating physician thought ideal (four
I 11. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101, 96
Stat. 324, 331 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1986)).
112. See generally Furrow, supra note 13 at 694-95.
113. Barry R. Furrow, The Ethics of Cost Containment: BureaucraticMedicine & the
Doctor as Patient Advocate, NoaTE DAME J. L., ETHICS, & PUB. POL'Y 189 (1988).
114. See William R. Roper, Balancing Efficiency and Quality-Toward Market-Based
Health Care, 3 NoTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 169 (1988) (analyzing the past and
future course for Medicare and its effects on health care cost and quality). See generally Barry
R. Furrow, Medical Malpracticeand Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 985 (1986) (proposing four strategies for physician advocacy in refining the
beneficience principle in the world of cost containment); Furrow, The Ethics of Cost-Containment, supra note 113 at 216-17 (1988) (examining the role and benefit of interacting health
care cost containment with traditional tort law doctrine).
115. One could argue on this point that the abandonment cases require a direct subsidy
by the doctor, in cases where the doctor must continue to treat even though the patient owes
the doctor money on a past bill. See Ricks v. Budge, supra note 49 (holding that it is a
question for the jury whether plaintiff suffered damages by a physician's refusal to continue
treatment of plaintiff unless plaintiff satisfied an old account).
116. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. Ct. 1986), published at 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987) (debating whether the physician or health care payor bears responsibility for allowing a patient
to be discharged prematurely).
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days instead of eight). The physician had applied for an extension
of hospitalization time from Medi-Cal (California's Medicaid program), had been refused, and had not filed an appeal. Dicta in the
case suggests that the court expected treating physicians to be aware
of the reimbursement structure and to engage in bureaucratic infighting when necessary, exhausting procedural rights when the
utilization review process has rejected a recommendation.
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when
care which should have been provided is not provided should
recover for the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the
deprivation of such care, including, when appropriate, health
care payors... [The] physician who complies without protest
with the limitations imposed by a third-party payor, when his
medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate
responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the
health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the conse1 17
quences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.
If further payment was available dependent upon following an
appeals procedure, and the provider was ignorant of this procedure,
he might be liable for patient harm attributable to his ignorance. If
a patient is discharged against the better judgment of a treating physician when reimbursement is denied, he risks liability for malpractice. He has not made a good faith effort to "rescue" the patient
from further bad outcomes.
B. Joint Liability for Treatment Denied: Wilson I
The case of Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California118 qualified and limited Wickline but also expanded potential liability of
outside reviewers. It held that a physician could be jointly and severally liable with a utilization review body for a patient's bad
outcome.
Howard Wilson suffered from major depression, drug dependency, and anorexia. He entered College Hospital on March 1,
1983. An Alabama Blue Cross policy which covered Wilson had no
provision for concurrent utilization review. In 1983, Alabama Blue
Cross had delegated authority to California Blue Cross to do reviews. In 1983 California Blue Cross contracted with Western
Medical, a third party utilization review organization, to make determinations of medical necessity. Western applied federal Medicare utilization review standards to private insurance patients. On
117. Id. at 670-71.
118. 222 Cal. App. 3d 660 (1990).
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March 11, Western Medical decided that Wilson's hospital stay was
not justified or approved. Although Dr. Taft, the treating physician, felt that Wilson would require three to four weeks of care. Dr.
Taff did not appeal the utilization review determination made by
Western Medical. Wilson was discharged, and on March 31 he
killed himself. Dr. Taff felt that Wilson would have lived if he had
remained in hospital. The court refused to follow the Wickline
dicta, which had suggested that civil liability for a discharge decision rested solely within the responsibility of a treating physician.' 19
The court instead applied the test of joint liability for tortious conduct, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 431: "[An] actor's negligent conduct is legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no
rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in harm." 2 ' The court concluded that it was a triable issue of material fact as to whether
Western's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the suicide.
The relevant points of Wilson from the perspective of a duty to
rescue analysis are that (1) after denying further payment, the payer
or utilization reviewer cannot pass the buck to the treating physician for a discharge decision: they may be jointly liable for a "bad"
decision; (2) a doctor does not have to pursue appeal channels if
they are not clearly spelled out or well understood; the negative
2
implication is a doctor must appeal if the appeals process is clear.1 1
Wilson means that a physician may be held to affirmative obligations to demand further reimbursement for a ready patient.
C. The Duty to Coordinate Financing: Wilson H
One ongoing case based in part on an expansive view of physician obligations is Wilson v. Chesapeake Health Plan, Inc. 122 The
plaintiff Hugh Wilson, a thirty-one-year-old black employee of the
city of Baltimore, developed liver disease. He was a member of a
prepaid health plan, the Chesapeake Health Plan, Inc. (Chesapeake). Dr. Cooper, a specialist to whom Wilson was referred by
his primary care physician, repeatedly reassured Wilson that a liver
transplant would be covered under his HMO coverage.
119. Wickline, supra note 116, at 672.
120. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).

121. The jury in Wilson H (see footnote 122) used a clear and convincing standard to
reject liability for the utilization review body.
122. Plaintiff's amended complaint, Wilson v. Chesapeake Health Plan, Inc., (4th Cir.)
(No. 88019032/CL76201) (complaint is in the possession of the author).
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Dr. Cooper made arrangements with Presbyterian Hospital in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to put him on the list of donor liver recipients and to perform the transplant. In August of 1985 Wilson arrived at Presbyterian Hospital. At that time Chesapeake advised
the hospital that they were not certain that the plan would cover the
transplant. Wilson's admission was delayed, and a demand for full
payment was made. Wilson's wife Joyce worked to obtain financing. On August 28, a suitable liver was available but because Mr.
Wilson lacked evidence of financial coverage of the procedure, the
hospital threw the liver away. Between August 29 and September
4 Wilson deteriorated further. His wife returned to Baltimore to
work further on the financing problem, and learned that the Maryland Medical Assistance Program would pay for the procedure once
the Wilsons had spent down their savings. During this period a
second liver became available, but it was also thrown away. By
September 4, Wilson had deteriorated further. On September 5
Joyce Wilson returned to find Wilson in a coma. He died on September 6.
The plaintiffs pleaded a variety of theories. Count 16, Negligence, alleged that Dr. Cooper and the health plan
knew or should have known that staff and resources existed...
to assist the Wilsons in determining the scope of coverage provided by their HMO, other insurers, and alternative funding
sources, but they failed to utilize such resources, alert plaintiffs to
or advise them of the need to
the existence of such resources
123
identify a funding source.
The Wilson II duty means that providers, including outside specialists, should at a minimum know enough to refer patients to experts with a managed care organization or hospital when they need
information as to possible sources of funding for a medically necessary procedure. The bundle of services offered by the health care
provider, in these times of limited resources, now includes not only
medically correct diagnosis and treatment that complies with the
standard of care, but also information as to how to fund such care.
III.

INSTITUTIONAL CARE: EXPANDED
ACCOUNTABILITY

Hospitals began as the doctor's workshop, little more than a
shell within which health care services were provided. 2' 4 As they
123. Id. at 33. This count in the complaint withstood both a motion to dismiss and a

motion for summary judgment.
124. ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN

SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 3:31

have grown in complexity, their obligations to patients have also
grown. The health care institution provides support, equipment,
and administration to physicians, and is, therefore, responsible for
sloppy or careful practice within its walls. The notion of a covenant
is central to the role of the institution as well as the physician;
covenant
reminds the professional community that it is not good enough
for the individual doctor to be a good friend or parent to the
patient; that it is important also for whole institutions-the hospital, the clinic, the professional group--to keep covenant with
those who seek their assistance and sanctuary. Thus the concept
permits a certain broadening of accountability beyond personal
agency.125
A.

The Expansion of Tort Duties

Hospitals have a duty to provide adequate staff and services to
deal with expected medical problems. 1 26 Hospitals, like physicians,
are expected to keep up with with an evolving standard of medical
practice. In Washington v. Washington Hospital Center,2 7 the
court considered whether the defendant hospital should have had
end-tidal carbon dioxide monitors in place in 1987. This was a new
technology that many hospitals had installed by 1986. The defendant hospital argued that use by teaching hospitals was not a fair
standard of care, since "[i]nstitutions with significantly enhanced
financial resources and/or government grants which accelerate their
testing and implementation of new and improved technologies
would naturally have available to them items which, inherently,
were not yet required for the general populace of hospitals."'' 28 The
court rejected the argument, noting the effectiveness of the new
technology and its relatively low cost.
The failure of a hospital to maintain adequate services to deal
with medical emergencies can create liability. 129 Hospital responsibility goes beyond supplying up-to-date equipment. The power of
THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1989); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE
RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM (1987).

125. May, supra note 63, at 36.
126. Douglas v. Freeman, 814 P.2d 1160 (Wash. 1991) (recognizing hospital has duty to
provide necessary medical hospital assistance to a doctor and to supervise all those who practice medicine within its facilities).
127. 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
128. Id. at 183, n.5.
129. See Herrington v. Miller, 883 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1989) (failure to provide adequate
24-hour anesthesia service).
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the institution in managing hundreds of personnel and setting up

systems for smooth operation has led to judicial recognition of a
duty to design proper systems. For example, institutional providers
are increasingly expected to implement protocols that address difficult treatment and ethical issues. 130 Doctors have often used such
protocols to guide nurses in decisionmaking in their absence,13 1 and
such protocols are used to guide physician performance.' 32 Stan-

dardized approaches to a particular clinical or treatment problem
or approach are manifested in a health care institution through
written policies, bylaws, personnel directives, or educational programs.' 33 Internal manuals, including emergency room policy and
procedure manuals, are admissible at trial when they contain infor-

mation concerning general industry standards or evidence that an
institutional defendant violated its own policy. Liability will result

from institutional failure to study and take action, rather than from
action that, although reasonable when implemented, later proves to
be ineffective. Florida, for example, has incorporated by statute
"institutional liability" or "corporate negligence" in its regulation
of hospitals. Hospitals and other providers will be liable for injuries

caused by inadequacies in the internal programs that are mandated
34

1
by the statute.

A hospital and its contracting physicians may be liable for damages caused by defects in systems they develop and implement. In
the Florida case of Marks v. Mandel,1 35 the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action against the hospital, alleging negligence and

failure of the on-call system to produce a thoracic surgeon and fail130. An algorithm or protocol is "a set of instructions that describes how a patient who
comes with a given set of signs or symptoms should be managed, step by step, so that the
findings at each step influence which next step is to be taken, until the patient is successfully
diagnosed and treated." AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE METHODS AND FINDINGS OF QUALI-y ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING 38 (1985) (Vol. III of AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING).

131. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985) (stating the real negligence of Dr.
Hilbun, according to the plaintiff's expert from the Cleveland Clinic, was that he failed to
leave detailed protocols for the nursing staff describing what danger signs to watch out for
post-operatively).
132. Clinical algorithms have been converted to protocol charts and computerized algorithms that both define clearly how the clinician should make a decision and provide him
with appropriate feedback." Margolis, Uses of Clinical Algorithms, 249 JAMA, 627, 629
(1983).
133. For a study of unjustifiable costs using such algorithmic criteria as a quality audit,
see Michael P. Corder et. al., A FinancialAnalysis of Hodgkin Lymphoma Staging 71 AM. J.
PuB. HEALTH 376 (1981). For a lawyer's discussion of protocols in the hospital, see Barbara
R. Pankau, AIDS: Responding to the Issues, 3 HEALTH LAW. 1, 10 (1987).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.60 (West 1986).
135. 477 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1985).
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ure of the hospital staff to send the patient to a hospital with a
trauma center. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in excluding from evidence the hospital's emergency room
policy and procedure manual. This manual set out in detail how
the on-call system should operate and itemized procedures for responding to calls made from ambulances. The court held that evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of liability of the
hospital and the emergency room supervisor for the failure of the
on-call system to produce a thoracic surgeon in a timely fashion.
Support systems must also be adequate to handle the range of
problems the hospital purports to treat. Short staffing has thus been
rejected as a defense where the available staff could have been juggled to achieve closer supervision of a problem patient.1 36 Courts
are less tolerant of excuses for failures by institutions when patient
injury results. Institutions must run a well-managed system of care.
The fundamental principle of agency law is vicarious liability,
i.e., the master (employer) is responsible for the torts of his servant
(employee) even though the master was not negligent. It is a
nonfault rule of liability. In the medical setting, physicians have
traditionally been treated as independent contractors rather than
employees; as a result, the hospital is relieved of any agency-based
liability for their negligent acts. As the courts have considered the
range of situations in which physicians provide care in the hospital
setting, they have extended agency principles to limit the independent contractor defense and thereby circumvent vicarious liability
limitations. 137 An expanded notion of accountability is apparent in
the judicial treatment of agency law and independent contractor
defenses.
The control test was first used by the courts to test whether the
doctor was an employee or subject to the control of the hospital.
The courts apply a number of standard criteria for evaluating the
existence of a master-servant relationship. If the contract gives the
hospital substantial control over the doctor's choice of patients or if
the hospital furnishes equipment, then an master-servant relation136. Horton v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Ctr., 51 A.D.2d 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976) (holding hospital guilty of negligence in connection with a patient's fall from window
where hospital could have but failed to provide continuous supervision for the short time
before patient's mother-in-law arrived).
137. See generally ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH

CARE ADMINISTRATION, ch. XIV (2d ed. 1988); Note, Theoriesfor Imposing Liability Upon
Hospitals for Medical Malpractice: Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability, 11 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 561 (1985).
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ship can be found."" 8 The control test looks to the terms of the
contract and the actual relationship between the hospital and the

physician.
The inherent function test takes the inquiry one step further,
looking at those functions of a hospital which are essential to its

operation. Radiology labs and emergency rooms are two such functions. 139 This notion of "inherent function" overlaps substantially
with the "non-delegable duty" rule in agency law, as expressed in
corporate negligence cases. Where a function is considered to be an

inherent part of the functioning of the health care institution, the
courts have held that the institution cannot escape liability because
of the status of the physician. Vicarious liability applies in spite of a

physician's independent contractor status.
The ostensible agency or apparent authority test is also commonly used to channel liability from the negligent physician to the
health care institution. In some settings, such as the emergency
room or the radiology laboratory, the institution is held to offer
services to the patient through a doctor, even though the doctor

who renders the service is not an employee. The ostensible agency
or apparent authority test then looks to the patient and his expectations as to treatment. 140 Several jurisdictions have allowed cases to
138. The caselaw reflects divergent applications of the "control" test, because of the
breadth of the factors involved. See Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital, 52 A.D.2d 450 (N.Y.
1976) (doctor failed to give blood to patient, resulting in his death; hospital in the contract
between doctor and hospital had guaranteed doctor's salary and controlled his activities.
Court held doctor to be an employee); Kober v. Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966) (finding
contract establishes the method by which hospital hired a doctor as supervisor).
139. See, e.g., Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
140. See, e.g., Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding the
plaintiff failed to prove, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267, that he relied
upon representations that the physician was an agent of the hospital). When the plaintiff
entered the emergency room with a collapsed lung, an employee of the hospital said that he
had called Dr. Schneider, "... and he's our best person for the job." The court held that
statement was insufficient to satisfy the requirements to prove apparent authority because
plaintiff had then deliberated for several days before selecting Dr. Schneider to perform further surgery which gave rise to his injuries.
Apparent authority is governed by two alternative Restatement Sections. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a
third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965) provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which
are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as though
the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.
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proceed past summary judgment motions, or to go to the jury, on
agency-based theories of ostensible agency or apparent authority.
The courts use agency principles to hold a hospital liable for negligent acts of independent contractors such as radiologists or emergency room physicians. Hospitals have thus been held liable for the
acts of radiologists, residents, emergency room physicians, and sur14
geons, even though these persons were not hospital employees. '
Courts hold hospitals liable for the malpractice of their independent
contractor physicians where there is evidence that the hospital allowed or encouraged patients to believe that the physicians were
authorized agents of the hospital.
Other institutional forms have developed over the past decade.
Managed care networks are one example. Squeezed by reimbursement limitations and rising health care costs, employers and medical providers have turned to managed care to control costs. The
Director of the Federation of American Health Systems, Michael
Bromberg, describes managed care as "the hottest growth area in
health care delivery today."14 2 In one decade, the change from feefor-service care to managed care has become a stampede.'4 3 Health
care is increasingly delivered through large managed care systems,
with health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations (hereinafter PPOs) growing rapidly. About 60% of the
141. The number of courts that have adopted exceptions to vicarious liability, including
ostensible agency, include Shepard v. Sisters of Providence, 750 P.2d 500 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)
(resident clothed in ostensible authority when he assisted private surgeon in an operation
with a private patient, in the hospital); Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital, 423 N.W.2d
848 (Wise. 1988) (radiologists); Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 535 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super Ct.
1988) (surgeons); Richmond County Hospital Authority v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164 (Ga.
1987) (holding hospital liable for emergency room physicians under doctrine of ostensible or
apparent authority); Martell v. St. Charles Hospital, 523 N.Y.S. 2d 342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(holding hospital vicariously liable for emergency room physician's actions even if hospital
emergency room where actions occurred was run by an independent contractor); Strach v.
St. John Hospital Assoc., 408 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (physicians referred to
surgery unit as part of hospital's team and surgery team doctors exercised direct authority
over hospital employees); Barrett v. Samaritan Health Services, Inc., 735 P.2d 460 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (physician's organization vicariously liable for physician's actions).
142. Michael D. Bromberg, Managed Care - Who Reviews the Reviewers? 21 FED'N AM.
HEALiTH Sys. REV., July/Aug. 1988, at 6; see also Glenn Kramon, 'Managed Care' is Top
Plan Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1988, at D2, c.1.
143. The escalation in medical spending by both the Medicare program and private
health insurers has led to an intensified focus on managing health care costs. Traditional feefor-service insurance, which pays medical charges without question, has declined sharply
over the past few years. For example, Aetna Life and Casualty Company now covers only
22% of the 11 million people covered for health benefits, compared with 64% in 1988. Employees are offered the chance to join an HMO or other discount network more and more
frequently. Milt Freudenheim, Health Insurers' Changing Role, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1990,
at D2, c.l.
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160 million Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance
were enrolled in a managed care plan in 1987; in 1980 only 5 to
10% were enrolled in such plans. 1" HMOs and PPOs (excluding
managed fee-for-service plans) enrolled over 27% of employees
with group health insurance in 1987. This contrasts with 1981
145
figures of 4% enrollment.
Managed care organizations (hereinafter MCOs) create a new
set of relationships between payers, subscribers and providers.
These new relationships create new liability risks. The subscriber
typically pays his fee to the MCO rather than the provider, giving
up control over his treatment and choice of his treating physician.
The payer, in turn, shifts some of its financial risk to its approved
providers, who must also accept certain controls over their practice.
The physician, traditionally the patient's agent and advocate, as a
146
quid pro quo, now receives many patients from the payer.
Medical practice is therefore firmly embedded within a variety
of health care delivery structures. Doctors are affiliated with PPOs
or group practices with staff privileges at least at one hospital. The
physician without institutional linkages is a fading breed. The logic
of institutional responsibility has been readily extended to managed
care organizations. The relationship of the MCO to its member
physicians is more varied than that of the hospital with its medical
staff, and this relationship will determine the source of liability.
Staff model HMOs, employing physicians on a salaried basis in its
own medical facilities, satisfy the master-servant requirements of
agency law. In Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 47 the Sloans sued Metro, a health maintenance organization, alleging a negligent failure to diagnose. Metro claimed that its
physicians were independent in their practice of medicine, and that
Metro did not control their judgment in diagnosis or treatment decisions. It therefore invoked the "corporate practice of medicine"
144. Jon Gabel et. al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, 7 HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1988, at 48, 53.
145. Id. at 52. See also Kramon, supra note 117.
146. Ernest W. Saward & E.K. Gallagher, Reflections on Change in Medical Practice:
The Current Trend To Large-Scale Medical Organizations,250 JAMA 2820 (1983); Starr,
supra note 124.
Young doctors want to work in these new settings, to gain the advantages of free time and
control over work load. One survey found that more than 50% of the young doctors polled

preferred a guaranteed salary to traditional fee-for-service compensation, and 81% preferred
a group practice or HMO, while just 11% favored solo practice. Physicians want more time
for families and personal interests. Ron Winslow, Debt-Burdened Doctors Seek Financial
Security, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1989, at B1.
147. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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doctrine, which makes it unlawful for a corporation to practice
medicine. The defendant argued that a physician may not accept
directions in diagnosing and treating ailments from a corporation,
and is therefore an independent contractor. The court rejected this
defense, finding it to be a "non sequitur to conclude that because a
hospital cannot practice medicine or psychiatry, it cannot be liable
for the actions of its employed agents and servants who may be so
licensed.""14 An HMO, likewise, should not be insulated from liability. The court noted that Metro's staff physicians were under the
control of its medical director, a physician, and "[t]he circumstances establish an employment relationship where the employee
performed acts within the scope of his employment." 149 Independent practice association (hereinafter IPA) model HMOs that become "the institution", "hold out" the independent contractor as an
employee, and restrict provider selection are vulnerable to ostensible agency arguments. The development of complex cost and quality controls, which strengthen the supervisory role of the HMO,
together with the managed care industry's preference for the capitation method of physician compensation, are likely to lead the courts
to hold the IPA model HMO-physician relationship to respondeat
superior liability.
Malpractice cases have also extended the non-delegable duty
doctrine of agency law to impose obligations on hospitals as quasiutilities to maintain responsibility for emergency rooms. 150 In Jack148. Id at 1108.
149. Id. at 1109. In Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
a staff model HMO was held vicariously liable for physician malpractice, not of its employeephysician, but of an independent consulting physician. The court found grounds to hold the
HMO vicariously liable: (1) the consultant physician had been engaged by an HMO-employed physician, (2) the HMO had the right to discharge the consultant, (3) services provided by the consultant were part of the regular business of the HMO, and (4) the HMO had
some ability to control the consultant's behavior, since he answered to an HMO doctor, the
plaintiff's primary care physician. This judicial willingness to impose respondeat superior
liability for the negligence of a consulting, non-employee physician clearly applies to the IPA
model HMOs and even PPOs. In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) another ostensible agency case involving an HMO, the court asked whether
the IMO through its agents created the appearance that an agency relationship existed between the IMO and the negligent physician; and whether the patient reasonably relied upon
the appearance to his detriment or injury.
150. A non-delegable duty is an exception to the rule that an employer is not liable for
the negligence of an independent contractor. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 71, at 511-12 (5th ed. 1984). The court in Jackson v.
Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Alaska 1987) observed that a non-delegable duty analysis is
based upon a judicial assessment that '.. the responsibility is so important to the community
that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another." Id. at 512 (emphasis
added). Accord, Alaska Airlines v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 925-26 (Alaska 1977).
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son v. Power,15 1 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a hospital had
a "non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent physician care in its
emergency room." It could not shift liability onto independent contractors, once it determined that it had a duty to provide that emergency room care. The hospital, licensed as a "general acute care
hospital," was required to comply with state regulations designed to
promote "safe and adequate treatment of individuals in hospitals in
the interest of public health, safety and welfare," including the provision of a physician at all times to respond to emergencies. 52 It
had also voluntarily assumed a broader duty, as a result of its accreditation by the Joint Committee on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (hereinafter JCAHO).
The Jackson court analogized hospital emergency services to the
operation of an airline. Patients, like passengers, deserve protection. The court then noted the pervasive regulation of the hospital
industry in Alaska, as in other states, and the "close parallel between the regulatory scheme of airlines and hospitals. Undoubtedly, the operation of a hospital is one of the most regulated
activities in this state." The court gave a number of justifications
for its quasi-utility analysis: the implication from pervasive legislative regulation that the hospital is the ultimate repository of responsibility; public expectations of hospitals as responsible for the
quality of care rendered by physicians and finally, the commerciali153
zation of medicine.
A hospital as a public utility may capture the reality of today's
health care system. The health care industry is pervasively regulated, particularly by the federal government. Health care generally is viewed as an inappropriate industry for free market
principles. Health care at least in the emergency room in a crisis is
considered a necessity by most people, an expectation created by
hospitals over the years. 54 The halo effect of nonprofit status, and
151. 743 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Alaska 1987).
152. Id at 1382.
153. Jackson, supra note 151. Not all courts have found the Jackson position compatible.
The application of the non-delegable duty doctrine to hospitals was rejected in Estates of
Milliron v. Francke, 793 P.2d 824, 827-28 (Mo. 1990) (distinguishing Jackson since it involved radiology, not emergency room practice) and Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d
1038 (Ohio 1990) (noting that the normal application of nondelegable duty doctrine is premised on peculiar risks and special precautions attendant to the work itself, "The practice of
medicine in a hospital by an independent physician with staff privileges does not involve the
type of risks and precautions required.. .") Id. at 1048.
154. For an intriguing discussion of the role of expectations in generating claims, see
Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1881 (1992). Francis argues that expectations are based on beliefs about the future. The
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the willingness of hospital administrators to draw on this line of
credit in their marketing, supports obligations derived from public
expectations as to emergency care. 155 Given the extent of government regulation and the special status of health care, the argument
that hospitals approach the status of public utilities is a supportable
position. 5 6 It justifies imposing rescue obligations on institutions,
and requires that they meet a heavy burden of proof to avoid responsibility for such care.
B.

Hospitals and Indigent Care: From Charity to Obligation

Hospitals and other institutions have extensive obligations to
properly treat their patients, once they enter the hospital. But what
are the obligations of institutions to "rescue" distressed individuals
who present themselves at the hospital door? Emergency rooms are
a visible combat zone in the American health care systemoverburdened, understaffed and underfinanced. They have become
the gateway to the health care system for the uninsured and the
indigent, a safety net of last resort to replace the shrinking government net. 157 Yet trauma centers and emergency rooms have been
eliminated in the past few years to stem financial losses. ' From
more unreasonable the beliefs, the less moral weight they carry, and context determines the
reasonableness of the beliefs.
Francis proposes "encouragement" as a second feature of expectations that deserve moral
weight. "Without the acknowledgement that it is sometimes reasonable to rely on assurances
that expectations will be fulfilled, much planning would be undercut." Ma2at 1892.
155. The mission of a hospital, and its projection to the community at large, creates expectations. "Voluntarism, community, and cooperation are potent values for hospitals,
which deliver care. Hospitals sit in one place and render intimate, caring human services to
people who often feel a personal identification with the institutions' histories, staffs, and corporate identities. None of this applies to health insurance,whose tasks are actuarial, techniLaurence D. Brown, Capture and Culture:
cal, impersonal, and bureaucratic."
OrganizationalIdentity in New York Blue Cross, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 651, 669
(1991).
156. See William F. Corley, Hospitalsas a Public Utility: or "Work with Us Now or Work
for Us Later, 2 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 304 (1978); AJ. Priest, Possible Adaptation of
Public Utility Concepts in the Health Care Field, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 839 (1970).
157. Robert Stem et. al., The Emergency Department as a Pathway to Admission for Poor
and High-Cost Patients, 266 JAMA 2238, 2243 (1991):
In summary, our study has shown that certain patient groups often thought to be
disadvantaged - the elderly, nonwhites, the poor - are more likely than other
patient groups to be admitted through the emergency department, and admission
through the emergency department is associated with higher costs of care ....
Some system to compensate hospitals for these additional costs may be worthwhile
to preserve access to care for disadvantaged patients and to ensure the financial
viability of institutions that serve the disadvantaged.
158. Melinda Bech et. al., State of Emergency: Hospitals are seeking radicalsolutions to
ease walk-in patient overload, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991 at 52 (discussing the means hospitals have pursued to deal with the walk-in overload).
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the hospital's viewpoint, undesirable patients enter through the
emergency room, stressing hospital budgets.159 The goal has often

been to transfer them as soon as possible to public hospitals. Where
treatment is given, hospitals tend to undertreat patients if their insurance coverage is inadequate. 1" A 1988 study of a publicly subsidized hospital in Memphis found that during one 92-day study,
private hospitals made 190 requests to transfer patients to the public

facility. Almost all patients transferred (91%) were sent for primarily economic reasons. One fourth of these patients were unstable, according to explicit clinical criteria, upon arrival at the public

hospital. 161 But most hospitals are
still trying to reduce bad debts
162

by avoiding nonpaying patients.
1.

SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS TO RENDER CARE. The sources

and limits of obligations on hospitals to render emergency care have
159. James M. Perrin, High Technology and Uncompensated Hospital Care in UNcoMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILMES (Frank Sloan et. al., eds.,

1986).
Much uncompensated hospital care does not involve high-technology services.
Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion does arise from the intensive care of sick and
premature newborns, accident victims, and people suffering from certain malignancies. In one private academic teaching hospital, newborn care accounts for almost
25 percent of uncompensated care.
Id. at 70.
160. Paula A. Braveman et. al., Differences in HospitalResource Allocation Among Sick
NewbornsAccording to Insurance Coverage, 266 JAMA 3300 (1991). The study examined the
relationship between health insurance coverage and utilization of hospital inpatient services
by sick newborns. It concluded that similar pressures were found on providers across all
hospital ownership types.
The observed pattern of hospital resource suggests strongly that allocation of hospital services to sick newborns was influenced significantly by expected reimbursement rather than determined strictly by medical need.
Id. at 3307.
Comparisons between newborns without insurance and those with prepaid private
coverage also contribute to the ability of this study to indicate the far greater likelihood of too little care for some groups than too much care for others. It is known
that care provided in the first days of life can have a significant impact on a highrisk newborn's chances for long-term survival and optimal health and development.
The concept of equity suggests that treatment provided to sick newborns should be
based on clinical criteria alone. The finding of allocationoffewer hospitalservices to
vulnerable groups likely to be at higher risk during the first days of life constitutes
primafacie evidence of serious inequity and suggests the needfor intensive and systematic public surveillance of the pressures on institutions, providers, and patients
under current health carefinancingsystems. (emphasis added)
Id. at 3308.
161. See Arthur L. Kellerman & Bela B. Hackman, Emergency Department Patient
'Dumping': An Analysis of InterhospitalTransfers to the RegionalMedical Center at Memphis,
Tennessee, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1287 (1988). See also Robert L. Schiffet al., Transfer to a
PublicHospital: A ProspectiveStudy of 467 Patients,314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986).
162. See George J. Annas, Your Money or Your Life: 'Dumping' UninsuredPatientsfrom
HospitalEmergency Wards, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 74 (1986).
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been well described by other commentators. 163 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations' Accreditation
Manualfor Hospitalsstates: "Unless extenuating circumstances are
documented in the patient's record, no patient is arbitrarily transferred to another hospital if the hospital where he is initially seen
has the means for providing adequate care." 164
State courts have developed common law doctrinal bases for a
duty on hospitals to care for patients who could not pay, but the
duty has not been contagious. 165 A hospital's emergency department is presumed to have a duty to provide care to all who seek
it. 166 Courts have adopted a number of different strategies to this
end. They have stretched the facts to find an admission, so that the
doctor-patient relationship exists.167 A nurse who examines a patient and calls a doctor has thus created a provider-patient relationship with a facility.16 8 A second strategy has been to find a duty to
treat based on public reliance or established custom. 1 69 This approach has not found much support, and raises difficult issues regarding the definition of "emergency" and the nature and extent of
care to be provided. 7 ' A third approach, one that the Alaska
Supreme Court in Jackson articulated in its vicarious liability analy163. Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide
Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21 (1989).
164. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDIDATION

OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,

AMH ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS § 1.33 (1990).
165. Wilmington Gen. Hospital v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961) (finding that
where a hospital refuses service to a patient in case of an unmistakable emergency, liability is
on the hospital if the patient has relied on a well-established custom of the hospital to render
aid in such a case).
166. J. Koeze, Access to Treatment, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW: CRITICAL ISSUES
FOR HOSPITALS,HMOs, AND EXTENDED CARE FACILITIES § 6.2.1, 424 (Anne M.Dellinger
ed., 1991).
167. See discussion of Noble v. Sartori, text at § II.
168. O'Neill v. Monteflore Hosp., (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (reversing a lower court decision to dismiss the case in favor of the hospital where the plaintiff's proof was sufficient to
permit the inference that the nurse in charge of the emergency ward undertook to provide
medical attention for the deceased).
169. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961) (holding private hospita may be liable for refusal of service to a patient in case of emergency if the patient has
relied upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render care in such a case) is the
leading case for a reliance approach. See also Williams v. Hospital Auth. of Hall County, 168
S.E.2d 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (holding public hospital which assumes the duty of furnishing emergency first-aid facilities to injured persons cannot arbitrarily refuse its facilities to a
member of the public in need of such treatment); Mercy Medical Ctr. of Oshkosh v. Winnebago County, 206 N.W.2d 198 (Wis. 1973) (discussing the social policy that private hospitals
with emergency rooms have a duty to admit those in need of such service because the public
expects such service).
170. Supra, note 139, at 425-27.
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sis, is to hold hospitals to be public utilities, with a fiduciary duty
owed to the public for emergency care.17 1
State and federal legislation has reduced the significance of com-

mon law duties by offering explicit mandates for emergency care.172
The most powerful current statutory source of obligations is The
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (hereinafter COBRA),17 the Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active

Labor Act, enacted to counter the emerging scandal of patient
dumping. It mandates that patients be medically stable for transfer,
imposes stiff penalties for inappropriate transfers, and creates a civil
cause of action for damages. COBRA has been used to impose
sanctions on physicians and hospitals, 174 although it provides statu171. See eg., Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Assn., 366 A.2d 641, 644-646 (N.J. 1976) (holding
private, non-profit hospitals could not refuse to permit their facilities to be used for elective
abortions during first trimester pregnancy where hospitals had facilities for such abortions
and permitted use of facilities for therapeutic abortions), cert denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977);
Jeffrey E. Fine, Opening the ClosedDoorsm The Duty of Hospitals to Treat Emergency Patients,
24 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 123 (1983).
172. Over twenty states have some kind of regulation or statute that prohibits facilities
from denying emergency care based on ability to pay, although remedies are often deficient.
See Koeze, supra note 166, at 428. See also Dowell, supra note 1.
173. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 42 USC § 1395dd (1988) (examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor).
174. Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hospital District, 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.Tex.
1990):
Plaintiff's [a 16 year old pregnant woman] evidence demonstrates a long-standing
pattern of patient dumping, caused by staffing policies that in the opinion of a series
of medical experts would inevitably lead to standards of care at Memorial Hospital
that patently did not meet state or federal statutory requirements. Bluntly stated,
Memorial Hospital has callously and negligently allowed a situation to develop in
which all emergency obstetric and gynecological services to indigent patients-an
enormous and ever-increasing load-have been left to on-call private physicians like
Dr. Thompson, and the dumping of pregnant women has been the inevitable result.
Id at 1280.
Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991) (sixtyeight-year-old woman with chest pains, went to an Osteopathic, court held that either of the
following violations is sufficient because hospital has a strict liability standard to provide
screening: (1) hospital must provide a proper screening examination, and/or (2) patient may
not be discharged if the emergency medical condition has not stabilized).
Courts split over whether indigency must be established. See Nichols v. Estabrook, M.D.,
741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989) (holding liability cannot be based on COBRA, absent allegation by plaintiffs that their financial condition or lack of health insurance contributed to
defendant's decision not to treat their son and to send him to another hospital, where family
pediatrician would be in attendance). Contra, Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Cotp.,
933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding act draws no distinction between patients with and
without health insurance yet it does not create simply another malpractice cause of action).
Accord, Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
act is not limited to indigent or uninsured persons who seek treatment or examination at
hospital emergency rooms and hospital met its duty to stabilize patient in emergency room
and thus did not violate the act even though patient was misdiagnosed).
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tory escape clauses for providers who want to avoid caring for indigents who enter through the emergency room.17 5 COBRA has
attracted much analysis and worry on the part of providers, given
its explicit demand for forced rescue under the specific circumstances of the Act. It is the most recent expression of our political
willingness to conscript hospitals to rescue patients they would
otherwise try to avoid.
2. THE TAX COLLECTOR. Prior to 1950, most nonprofit institutions were donatively supported, providing services that served
the public good-they were traditional charities, easily distinguishable from business firms. By 1950, however, hospitals had evolved
from donative institutions to commercial nonprofits.1 76 With the
growth of technological medicine and of health care financing
through the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
hospitals have become mainstream service institutions providing
medical care on a fee-for-service basis to the public at large,
while performing little or no role in subsidizing care for the poor.
Nevertheless, seventy-five percent of general hospitals remain
nonprofit today, presumably in large part as a consequence of
institutional inertia. They are anachronistic and perhaps also a
bit opportunistic, continuing to trade on whatever goodwill attaches to the image of a nonprofit organization, and enjoying as
well the benefits of tax exemption and other fiscal and
177 regulatory
privileges that nonprofit status continues to bring.
The tax exemption granted to nonprofit hospitals by the federal,
state, and local governments has been a continuing and massive
subsidy.17 Comprising less than 3% of all nonprofit organizations,
hospitals account for more than half of nonprofit sector expenditures. 1 79 But charitable giving to hospitals has dropped considerably since 1968.180
The federal government, through Internal Revenue Service
(hereinafter IRS) tax exemptions for hospitals and other providers,
175. See Rothenberg, supra note 164.
176. Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law ofNonprofit Organizations Do Current Trends
Make Good Policy? 39 CASE W. RES.L. REV. 807, 813 (1988-89).
177. Id at 813-14.
178. Hall & Colombo, supra note 18, at 314 n.18.
179. JAMES T. BENNETT & THOMAS . DILORENZO, UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE PROFITS OF NONPROFITS 73 (1989).

180. The nonprofits have become similar, and one commentator writes that "[b]y the
mid-1960s ...the notion of an institution closely connected to its community seemed like a
romantic remnant of a 'pre-scientific' era." David Rosner, Heterogeneity and Uniformity:
Historical Perspectives on the Voluntary Hospital, in SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 122 (1988).
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has made health policy by indirection since 1969.18" In that year the
IRS ruled that hospitals do not have to provide free or below-cost
care to those unable to pay in order to retain their federal charitable
tax exemption.1 8 2 This ruling removed an important barrier to
"dumping" indigent patients by allowing voluntary nonprofit hospitals to refuse to treat uninsured patients.1 8 3 The ruling described a
hospital which "limits admissions to those who can pay the cost of
their hospitalization, either themselves or through private health insurance, or with the aid of the public programs such as Medicare."
A hospital is charitable, since "by providing hospital care for all
those persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof either
directly or through third-party reimbursement, [the] hospital... is
promoting the health of a class of persons that is broad enough to
benefit the community." This explanation left open the argument
that a hospital that accepted Medicare and Medicaid patients and
had an emergency room open to all was one way to get the exemption, but not the only way. The IRS position, based on a staffer's
research, was that Medicare and Medicaid had eliminated the need
for free care for patients, and the demand for such care was
1 4
disappearing.
For the next twenty years, the IRS neither clarified nor enforced
its rulings.18 1 "There is no record of a nonprofit hospital losing its
charitable status for turning away patients from its emergency room
for inability to pay, for transferring such a patient to a public hospital even though the transfer was medically sound, or for refusing
1 86
patients enrolled in Medicaid."
181. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as HealthPolicy: Hospitals,
the InternalRevenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 251 (1991).
182. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, also released as T.I.R. 1022, dated Oct. 28, 1969.
183. Fox and Schaffer, supranote 181, argue that the IRS made policy without admitting
it.
In our interpretation of events, the Internal Revenue Service, thinking that it was
merely reasoning from legal principles, in effect accepted the hospital industry's
view of the history and purpose of hospitals ... The Internal Revenue Service
accepted the hospital industry's argument, to a large extent, as the result of research
by a junior member of its staff... They accepted without verification that hospitals
are primarily places where sophisticated medical procedures are carried out for the
benefit of entire communities, most of whose residents had or would shortly have an
insurer or public agency willing to pay their bills. In this formulation, an appropriate use of any surplus revenue of nonprofit hospitals would be to purchase new
technology rather than to subsidize the cost of care.
Id at 252-53.
184. Id. at 260.
185. UNITED STATES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATION HAND-

BOOK, § 349.2 (May 18, 1988).
186. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 181, at 273.
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The current IRS stance is intensified scrutiny of not-for-profit

hospitals' operations. Hospital audits have stepped up, and the IRS
is exploring a "Closing Agreement" policy with facilities, allowing
hospitals to keep tax-exempt status while correcting problems.I8 7

Some states have taken a more aggressive position, administering the exemption on a hospital-specific, annual basis, requiring

each hospital to demonstrate yearly its delivery of free care in an
increment sufficient to earn the subsidy.188 Other state taxing au-

thorities have moved aggressively to compel uncompensated care in
exchange for tax exemptions of health care providers. The most
famous of these actions, in Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care, Ina,189 required a level of free care beyond that provided by
Intermountain, leading to the revocation of their tax-exempt status.

Most other states have been satisfied with mere availability of indigent care, without more, while others simply presume that provision of health care is a charitable purpose." 9 Pennsylvania and a
few other states have been pockets of aggressive scrutiny of hospitals. 19' As the IRS position toughens, the states are more likely to

follow suit, in search of revenue, with increased skepticism toward
the claims of charity so readily accepted by taxing authorities from
hospitals in the past. 192
187. Jeffrey M. Green, IRS to explore closing agreement with hospitalr.AHA NEws, May
4, 1992, at 1; Ron Winslow, IRS Reviews Nonprofit Hospitals For Abuses of Tax-Exempt
Status, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1992, at BI.
188. Hall and Colombo, supra note 18, at 325-36. Alabama allows a tax exemption only if
the hospital demonstrates that 15% of its business constitutes treatment of charity patients,
or free care. Each hospital must certify annually to the tax commissioner that this test is met.
ALA. CODE ANN. § 40-9-1(2) to -1(3) (Supp. 1992).
189. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (holding that hospital was not exempt from property tax
because it did not meet the definition of a charity).
190. See, eg., Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont v. City of Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352
(Vt. 1989) (hospital was not required to prove it dispensed free care; fact that it made health
care available was sufficient to allow tax-exempt status).
191. Terese Hudson, Not-for-profit Hospitals Fight Tax-Exempt Challenges, HosPrrALs,
Oct. 20, 1990, at 32-37.
192. See Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y Board of Equalization of Latah
County, 804 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1990) (denying tax-exempt status to independent living facility
division of multi-level care facility while granting tax-exempt status to skilled nursing division); Chicago Health Servs. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 462 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1990)
(holding that hospital's auxiliary outpatient facility did not meet the definition of institution
of public charity and was not entitled to property tax exemption); Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306 (1985) (holding that organization which is a
provider of statistical analysis of patient treatment and cost date to hospitals was not a charitable organization and was not exempt from sales and use tax); Cape Retirement Community,
Inc. v. Kuehle, 798 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct.App. 1990) (holding retirement home was not exempt from taxes because its application procedure did not provide equal access to both rich
and poor).
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IV. INSURER RESPONSIBILITIES
Experimental treatments that promise rescue from certain death
for desperate individuals are often at the heart of insurance litigation. Third party payers often refuse reimbursement of "experimental" treatment under insurance policies covering only
"accepted" medical treatments. These disputes raise two issues:
(1) Is the treatment in fact experimental? (2) Is it excludable under
the policy language?1 93 Distinguishing experimental from accepted
treatments is difficult, since medical professionals often disagree.
The need to control costs and avoid quack remedies justifies payer
sensitivity to wasting resources on useless rescue attempts by providers and patients.1 94 However, the history of insurance regulation
suggests the need to tip the balance toward subscribers and patients
when the therapy has some admitted efficacy. 195 Mandated rescue
by insurers through compelled payment of treatment has been
achieved by the courts in several cases, where the insurer could not
justify its refusals except on the basis of saving money.
Courts interpret ambiguity in favor of subscribers in close cases,
demanding coverage exclusions that leave no room for doubt, recognizing the imbalance of power between insurer and insured.1 96
Courts require that contracts disclose relevant information and use
clear language that the layman can understand. Courts construe
193. Paul J. Molino, Reimbursement Disputes Involving Experimental Medical Treatment, 24 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 329 (1991); Jennifer Belk, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance Contracts:A Proposalfor JudicialResponse, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 809 (1991); Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy - A Third party
Payer's Dilemma, 323 N. ENG. J. MED. 1702 (1990).
194. Grace P. Monaco & Rebecca L. Burke, Insureras Gatekeeper - Part Two: Policy
Obstacles in Unproven Methods Litigation, 20 FORUM 400 (1985).
195. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding the coverage denial based on a treatment's success rate of less than 50% may be an
unreasonable application of an experimental treatment exclusion); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster
Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131 (D. N.J. 1989) (stating insurer abused its discretion in evaluating a
treatment with criteria used to assess whether a treatment was investigational when the contract excluded experimental treatment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
196. Baucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991)
(chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant covered for treatment of breast cancer); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991) (holding if treatment not experimental for other forms of cancer, it is not experimental for breast
cancer); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding
high dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant was covered under the
specific language of the policy); Fasio v. Montana Physicians' Serv., 553 P.2d 998 (Mont.
1976) (holding treatment prescribed by a licensed physician was covered notwithstanding
insured's contention that services performed were "experimental" and "unnacceptible medical practice"; also holding that failure to notify plaintiff's of policy change excluding certain
types of treatment bars insurer from taking advantage of the exclusion).
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coverage clauses broadly and exclusions narrowly.1 97 Insurers bemoan the difficulty in drafting adequate exclusions for experimental
therapy, since courts subject any restrictive attempts to careful scrutiny. Their concerns may be legitimate, but the courts still demand
a fair evaluation of the usefulness of treatments and full disclosure
to subscribers of any exclusions. Otherwise, a duty to rescue
through reimbursement will be enforced. "Say what you mean, or
you pay" is the maxim of contract interpretation in the courts.
Contracts, health care advertising, and a past history of insurance
coverage create expectations in the public, so insurers cannot get a
free ride on those expectations while avoiding responsibility when
the bill comes due.1 98
The pressure from the courts, through application of rules of
contract interpretation in favor of subscribers, has motivated insurers to fund definitive experiments to resolve the issues over accepted
versus experimental therapies. Blue Cross and Blue Shield's support for a clinical trial of the drug HDCT-ABMT in the treatment
of advanced staged breast cancer is a recent example. 199 The incentive effect of the courts' interpretive rules is evident, driving insurers
toward a form of rescue of subscribers by covering experimental
therapies that may prolong life, until a clinical resolution of efficacy
is established. Insurers are caught in a web of equity issues and can
only extricate themselves by proving that the evidence does not justify payment.
V.

PROFESSIONAL GROUPINGS AND OBLIGATIONS:
MANDATING COORDINATION OF CARE

Physicians as part of a professional group may have an obligation to coordinate care in some fashion for discrete groups of patients in distress. Ethicists often articulate this as a moral
obligation, which does not bind any one physician.2 " ° But can it be
197. McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 440 (N. D. Cal.
1983) (holding the proper interpretation of the insurance policy clauses is broad for coverage
clauses and narrow for exclusion clauses).
198. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance: Honoring
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. Rv. 1151, 1192 (1981) (creation by
insurers of a misleading impression about coverage explains use by courts of equitable principles to find for insureds).
199. Ron Winslow, Blue Cross to Help Payfor Clinical Test on ControversialBreast Cancer Therapy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1990, at B4, c.1.

200. "[P]rofessionals recognize a responsibility to establish equal opportunity for or equal
access to their services... This obligation belongs to professions as a whole and cannot be
directly reduced to a similar obligation on the part of individual professionals." Bayles, supra
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a binding legal obligation at the group level, without penalizing any
one physician? Patients may be too poor to pay for care, may refuse
to comply with a prescribed course of treatment, may have a contagious disease that terrifies the provider,20 1 or may interfere with a
provider's care of other patients. Yet they all are patients needing
treatment and demanding a Good Samaritan for their rescue. Consider the problem of Brenda Payton. In Payton v. Weaver,2 "2
Brenda Payton, a black woman with end stage renal disease, sued
her physician to force him to continue treating her. She needed
hemodialysis two or three times a week to stay alive. She was a
poor woman living on Social Security in a housing project, addicted
to heroin and barbiturates for over 15 years, overweight, with emotional, and alcohol problems. Reluctantly, Dr. Weaver finally decided to stop giving her dialysis in his outpatient clinic, since she
had failed to abide by the treatment regimen and was sometimes
abusive during dialysis when several patients were hooked up to the
single dialysis machine. Dr. Weaver finally told Brenda that he
could no longer treat her. However, he did supply her with a list of
the names and telephone numbers of all dialysis providers in San
Francisco and the East Bay.
The court focused on the ability of the patient to control her
disruptive conduct. "Absent such control or modification her conduct was of such a nature as to justify respondent hospitals in refusing to permit her access to their facilities. Whatever collective
responsibility may exist... it is clearly not absolute, or independent
20 3
of the patients' responsibility."
Physicians who refuse to treat a difficult patient can create severe financial and treatment problems for that patient. In another
case, a patient, Jeanie Joshua, suffered from kidney disfunction.
She suffered further injury when a home dialysis unit malfunctioned. She then sued the physician in charge of her care, the
note 32, at 27. See also Michael D. Bayles, A Problem of Clean Hands: Refusal to Provide
ProfessionalServices, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 165-81 (1979).
201. Oscar W. Clarke & Robert B. Conley in The Duty to "Attend Upon the Sick' 266
JAMA 2876 (1991), express concern about the willingness of doctors to care for patients with
AIDS. The First Code of Ethics adopted by the AMA in 1847 defined an ethical duty to
treat patients in "times of pestilence". In 1912, the AMA asserted that doctors have the
freedom to choose which patients they will serve. In the 1957 Code of Ethics, the duty to
treat patients described in 1847 was eliminated. See Walter J. Friedlander, On the Obligation
of Physiciansto Treat AIDS: Is There a HistoricalBasis? 12 REV. INFECTIOUS DiSEAsES 191
(1990). See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.024 (Supp. 1992) (prohibiting individual health care
providers from refusing to treat patients because they have AIDS).
202. 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).

203.

d at 231.
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maker of the machine, the home nurse, and others. She was forced
to seek conventional dialysis. None of the kidney specialists nor six
kidney centers in Santa Barbara and Ventura Counties would accept her for dialysis. She was, therefore, required to drive three
times a week to Los Angeles, a round trip of 150 miles.2" The
physicians who refused to treat her maintained simply that she was
a difficult, noncompliant patient.20 5
The court in Payton v. Weaver noted that health care providers
might have to find a way to share the responsibility for difficult
patients:
[W]hile disruptive conduct on the part of a patient may constitute good cause for an individual hospital to refuse continued
treatment, since it would be unfair to impose serious inconvenience upon a hospital simply because such a patient selected it, it
may be that there exists a collective responsibility on the part of
the providers of scarce health resources in a community, enforceable through equity [italics added], to share the burden of difficult
patients over time, through an appropriately devised contingency
plan. 2°6
This novel suggestion rests on a judicial assumption of a legal obligation for providers to treat a patient, thereby sharing the burden.
The courts are capable of developing principles of group responsibility, using existing powers in equity. Where a group of providers
has a special responsibility to persons with a concrete need for coordinated care, these providers should be able to be obligated to work
out among themselves a method for providing that care.20 7
The government is the best coordinator of any rescue situation
involving large numbers. But if the government, i.e., the legislature
or the administrative agencies with authority, does not act, can a
court exercising its equitable powers, so called "public action" powers, force providers collectively (if they are subject to the courts'
204. Ms. Joshua was quoted as saying, "The tragedy is that I am forced to make this my
total preoccupation. When you are left without life support in the area where you live, it takes
over your whole life. So granted I'm a big pain in the butt. What's that got to do with denying

me life support?" Robert Reinhold, When DoctorsShun Difficult Patients, N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1988, at A16.
205. Id.
206. Payton, supra note 175, at 230.
207. If A's interests are vulnerable to the actions and choices of a group of individuals,
either disjunctively or conjunctively, then that group has a special responsibility, to (a) organize (formally or informally) and (b) implement a scheme for coordinated action by members
of the group such that A's interests will be protected as well as they can be by that group,
consistently with the group's other responsibilities. Goodin, supra note 35, at 136. Goodin
further observes that "Itihe more realistic the case, the greater the need for coordination." Id.
at 137.
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powers jurisdictionally) to find a way to treat indigents? Why not
derive individual duties from collective duties imposed by the
courts, legislature, ethics of professional organizations?
One collective duty that can be found in caselaw is a duty of
institutions and groups within institutions to monitor the workings
of the scheme to make sure that everyone who is vulnerable is protected. Such groups and their members are occasionally assigned
responsibility in cases of failure to rescue. Suppose a patient is left
paralyzed through some failure during surgery and no one claims to
be able to reconstruct the causal factors that led to the injury. Tort
doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur reconstruct negligence by dispensing with a plaintiff's need to prove fault of any one particular
defendant with specificity.208 This relaxation is based in some situations on assumptions of group responsibility. 20 9 The doctrine of
joint and several liability then imposes the obligation to pay the injured patient upon each health care provider causally implicated in
the patient's injury. 2 10 Hospital corporate negligence has likewise
imposed a new burden on hospitals to account for the behavior of
physicians and other staff who are purportedly independent contractors. 21' Hospitals have been held to a duty to supervise the
medical care given to patients by staff physicians. Providers must
detect physician incompetence or take steps to correct problems
upon learning information raising concerns of patient risk. Hospitals must have proper procedures developed to detect impostors.21 2
They should also properly restrict the clinical privileges of staff physicians who are incompetent to handle certain procedures; they also
need methods to divine a staff doctor's concealment of medical errors.2 13 A failure to implement proper procedures to detect physi208. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL AccOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 173-74 (1985).

209. The classic case recognizing the team practice of medicine in a hospital, and the
need for collective responsibility to prevent patient injury is Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d
687 (Cal. 1944) (holding all members of operating room liable for negligence during surgery);
see also Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975) (holding defendant must prove lack of
liability in case where foreign object left in patient's body after surgery).
210. As to joint and several liability generally, see W. Prosser & P. Keeton, Torts § 50
(5th ed. 1984).
211. For a good description of the justification for corporate negligence on hospitals, with
a full citation of cases, see Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
212. See. eg., Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (holding non physician
fraudulently obtained an appointment to the medical staff, after having assumed the name of
a deceased Italian physician; the court applied corporate negligence, noting that at least seventeen jurisdictions had adopted the doctrine.); Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 11 N.E.2d 899
(N.Y. 1937) (hospital held liable for allowing a quack to treat a patient on its premises).
213. See Cronic v. Doud, 523 N.E.2d 176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding hospital can be
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cian problems leads to direct liability for patient injury.
The obligation of a health care institution to protect patients has
been considerably expanded by both courts and legislatures. The
next step should be to impose upon professional groups a duty to
rescue individuals in desperate situations. The AIDS epidemic is
one recent example of a crisis that has left many patients without
access to health care, as dentists and physicians in some communities have refused patients, or have set up waiting lists to indirectly
avoid treating such patients.2 14 Dental and medical associations in
such situations have sometimes been slow to react to patient need,
in spite of their self-proclaimed ethical obligations. Should not a
legal duty be imposed at the professional group level, to find professionals to provide care? Such a duty could be tort- or fiduciarybased, derived from standards set forth in the ethical rules of that
association. Ideally, injunctive relief beyond damages would be desirable to motivate proper rescue in such distress circumstances. Or
it could be made a condition of licensure, with a system set up that
would allow buying out of such service in special cases, so long as
coverage was available.
VI.

REDRAWING THE MAP

[I]deals of private charity and voluntarism. ., act as the opiate of
the American public, deluding a basically decent people into believing that.., deeply troubling social problems requiring whole
dollars for their solution [can] be adequately addressed with just
two bits' worth of trickle-down generosity....
liable for breaching duty to know qualifications and standard of performance of the physicians who practice on its premises); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital, 350 A.2d 535 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (holding hospital could be held liable to patient for permitting
known incompetent physician to perform abdominal surgery and in allowing him to remain
on the case when the situation was obviously beyond his control).
Under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), hospitals must
check a central registry, a national database maintained by the Unisys Corporation under
contract with the Department of Health and Human Services, before a new staff appointment
is made. This database contains information on individual physicians who have been disciplined, had malpractice claims filed against them, or had privileges revoked or limited. If the
hospital fails to check the registry, it is held constructively to have knowledge of any information it might have gotten from the inquiry.
214. In Wilmington, Delaware, in 1986 and 1987, for example, persons with AIDS
(PWAs) were unable to get dental care. Local dentists were unwilling to treat such patients,
in spite of the rhetoric of professional dental ethics. Moral suasion was at first unsuccessful,
and a legally enforcable duty upon the professional group, to come up with an access solution, would have been extremely valuable.
215. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Charity at a Price, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Aug 20, 1989, at 14.
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A. The Ideal: Redistribution in the Liberal State
State and federal governments provide direct subsidies through
Medicaid, as do some counties and municipalities, for indigent
health care. In all but three states, state or local governments are
obligated by statute or constitution to provide some medically indigent health care. 16 The cost totalled 3.9 billion dollars in 1982.
Rate regulation at the state level also allows for subsidies for the
provision of indigent care. State or county hospitals provided 11.6
billion dollars worth of indigent care in 1988. In other states, general assistance or general relief covers some care, as do Aid to Medically Indigent programs.2 1 7 Some states have adopted catastrophic
illness programs, or risk-sharing pools. For example, Hawaii has
required employers to provide employees with insurance. Other
states have focused on helping institutions that provide uncompensated care. States with all-payer rate setting systems have managed
to permit charge-shifting, or setting up special pools of uncompensated care funds. Other states have tried revenue pools. These efforts are not enough-they are scattered, uncoordinated, unrelated
to the distribution of the worst cases, and grossly inefficient.2 1 '
Mandated care of the indigent has been criticized as inefficient
and inequitable. Critics note that choice and access depend upon
proximity to providers that offer such care and upon accessing it
before the provider has offered all it is required to for that year. If
emergency room care is the only way to gain access, patients will
use it although ambulatory care would be far more efficient and
cost-effective. Mandated care may also impose perverse incentives
on providers to simply meet a quota of care, regardless of which
patients are in fact the neediest.2" 9 Such forced rescue may be attractive to government, allowing it to dodge responsibility, since its
cost does not appear as a line item in the budget, and leaves both
the revenue side and the expenditure side unaffected.2 2 Population
216. See Blendon, supranote 12, at 1160. For an example of how such a statute functions,
see Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Yankton County, 424 N.W.2d 379 (S.D. 1988) (county pays

for emergency hospitalization of indigent.).
217. State and county hospitals contributed up to $11.6 billion in 1988. In other states,
state general assistance or general relief covers some care, as do Aid to Medically Indigent
programs. Michael Dowell, State and Local Government Legal Responsibilities to Provide
Medical Carefor the Poor, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1988-89). See also Hall & Colombo, supra
note 18, at 307; Blendon, supra note 12.
218. Peter H. Schuck, Designing Hospital Care Subsidies for the Poor, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITES 69 (Frank A. Sloan et. al. eds.,

1986).
219. Id. at 77-78.
220. Id. at 78. "Especially in times of budgetary stringency, the temptation to achieve
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mobility and competition between states for low tax rates to attract
businesses may also have perverse effects upon state level efforts to
subsidize the poor.
A national solution to the problem of forced rescue is undoubtedly the best approach, particularly to subsidizing hospital care.
Government is a superior mechanism to private charity for collecting and redistributing income to the poor, achieving economies of
scale, and lowering overhead. 221 Several social programs-Medicare, even Medicaid with its minimum coverage requirementsdemonstrate some evidence of a political desire to provide a uniform
minimum with respect to health care for the poor.2 22 But that desire does not translate into adequate access for many citizens.
B.

The Hybrid Ideal: Government Plus Collective
Responsibility

A national solution to problems of indigent care in cases of
emergency or traumatic injury, while ideal, may come only in a
piecemeal fashion. The law should continue to articulate and expand affirmative obligations on health care professionals and their
institutions. These role or collective obligations flow from the special power and expertise of health care professionals. Such duties
plug the holes in the social net left by deficient social programs and
a lack of national or state political will.
Principled justifications for imposing affirmative duties to treat
can be derived from many sources. Health care institutions receive
large sums of federal money for treating Medicare and Medicaid
patients. These sums are conditioned on compliance with a variety
of federal obligations. Private parties such as employers, insurers,
and other providers also impose contractual demands through their
reimbursement agreements. 22 3 History plays a part, since hospitals
important social objectives such as subsidization of hospital care for the poor through mandated private expenditures rather than by raising taxes may prove nearly irresistible." Id.
221. It's a fine thing that our elected leaders have decided to use the bully pulpit to
encourage private charity. As a taxpayer, I don't even mind seeing a few of my
dollars going to pay for the propaganda. The trouble is that these same elected
leaders have used the same bully pulpit to poison the minds of citizens against the
mechanism of selflessness and social generosity that is at these leaders' actual disposal: the government. A free society deciding to tax itself to make itself a better
society-that's the real united way.
Michael Kinsley, Charity Begins With Government, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 74.
222. Id. at 80.
223. It is well accepted that the government may condition the receipt of federal moneys
upon reasonable conditions, so long as such conditions are clearly expressed. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("... if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.")
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have taken on burdens of care that now can be dropped only with
the greatest effort. This is so because of public expectations, created
in part by institutions and used by them to their advantage. A concept of stabilized expectations is at the heart of many such affirmative duties. Such expectations as to the availability of rescue allow
individuals to exist on a day-to-day basis free of the overriding anxiety that if they are hit by a car, or struck by a catastrophic illness,
they are doomed by lack of access to health care. For the poor, a
lack of access to health care can reduce life to a desperate Hobbesian terror that the liberal state promised to banish from our conception of a moral Republic.
Expectations evolve as the capabilities of the health care system
evolve, so that what was unrealistic, or simply not even contemplated in 1880, is now within the range of the possible. The power
of technology can mandate efficient rescue. Given the high costs of
accidents, a general legal duty to rescue would save lives and reduce
the cost of rescue operations.22 4 Relationships also create duties,
both through explicit contract terms and implied obligations.22 5
Finally, the fundamental nature of powerful institutions with
unique access to technologies, personnel, and information creates
obligations to treat all patients consistently.2 2 6 In cases involving
hospitals the language of the courts is full of the language of power
and responsibility, showing a judicial recognition of the resources
now commanded by modem health care institutions.2 27
The affimative obligations that this article has either discovered
in the legal landscape or argued as desirable can be summed up in
four propositions:
1. Nexus Demands Rescue. Individual providers face strong
claims by patients for care under difficult, quasi- or actual emergency circumstances. When a provider says, "Why me? Why
should I be forced to help?", we respond, "You are here and therefore in a position to help this victim. Is there a stronger claim upon
you now?" 22' 8 Has the role of physician created a covenant with
expectations legitimately felt by the public at large? Is there a nexus
224. See generally Lipkin, supra note 55.
225. See Shapo, supra note 93, at pt. I and pt. II.
226. Id.
227. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. 1984) (adopting the doctrine of
hospital corporate negligence justified by hospitals superior position to control physicians and
public's perception of hospital as a "multifaceted health care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and treatment rendered").
228. Goodin, supra note 35, at 126, asks this question.
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between provider and patient created by the facts of the specific
situation?
2. Institutions Owe Rescue. Institutional providers are visible
emblems of rescue in trauma crises, not easily disengaged once a life
in peril presents. As nonprofits are forced into competition to survive with for-profits, outpatient clinics, and franchised operations,
they have in many cases narrowed or dropped their traditional offerings of service, while expanding into money-making ventures.
The demands of taxing authorities, the mandates of COBRA, and
the duties of the common law are useful counterpressures to competitive pressures on hospitals to cut back on indigent care. At the
institutional level, the pressures of competition are likely to limit
indigent care unless countervailing pressures are created. Institutions are constructs, and the state, through its agents the courts and
the legislatures, may reconstitute these constructs in more productive ways.
3. Coordination of Rescue Should be Fostered. Collegial and
professional groupings have a duty to share and distribute burdens
where people are in need of rescue. The covenant binds the group
as well as the physician to figure out ways to provide care for those
in distress, those who are unpleasant or contagious, those too poor
to gain easy access. Hospital collaboration can sometimes be found
in sharing emergency cases and providing backups when centers are
overloaded. Other institutions have set up primary care clinics to
provide alternative services and systems of care,22 9 or screening and
treatment programs for the homeless.130 Local professional groups
have struggled to find "volunteers" to deal with risky patients. Cooperative efforts occur, but all too rarely. The development of affirmative obligations is a worthwhile project for courts or
legislatures, to extract from the professional group a level of rescue
that their ethical codes promise but often fail to deliver.
4. The liberal state owes the vulnerable access to necessary
care. The rights and privileges of citizenship support a strong argument that government should protect the vulnerable by setting a
threshold point of deserved care and funding it fairly. 231 Regional
planning or state resource reallocation, such as the Oregon Medi229. Id.
230. Frank Cerne, Californiahospital hits the road to carefor the homeless, AHA News,
May 4, 1992, at 5.
231. I leave for another discussion the problem of defined "deserved care", and the arguments for and against treating health care as a "right". However, at the level of emergency
care, for vulnerable and distressed individuals, a rights-based analysis is easily justifiable.
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caid experiment, might distribute certain health care more

fairly;232

access to emergency care, to prenatal and obstetric care, in situations where emergencies can be real and life-threatening, should be
assured.2 33 The liberal state has an obligation at a minimum to protect vulnerable citizens from medical emergencies. 234 Rights-based
obligations to rescue vulnerable patients in need of care will always
be needed in a world of scarce resources. In fairness we can demand that our health care providers fill in the gaps in the reimbursement net where a person will suffer serious harm without
rescue.

232. The attempts by the states to better allocate their scarce health resources is chronicled in John J.Kitzhaber & Mark M. Gibson, The Crisis in Health Care - The Oregon
Health Plan as a Strategyfor Change, 3 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 64 (1991).
233. For a discussion of the role of the non-poor in welfare and redistribution, with benefits also usually accruing to them, see ROBERT E. GOODIN ET. AL., NOT ONLY THE POOR:
THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE WELFARE STATE (1987); ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING
EVEN: AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION'S NEW POVERTY

(1988).
234. See generally ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE, (1988). Goodin makes a powerful argument for the welfare
state.
We individually and collectively have a strong moral responsibility to protect those
whose interests are especially vulnerable to our actions and choices. [It is an adjunct
to a market economy.] Both the market and the welfare state aim at essentially the
same end, after all. Both are basically mechanisms for promoting public welfare.
Id at 153-54. He rejects the position that the function of the welfare state is to coordinate
people's charitable impulses, that it is primarily "a means of eliminating those individual acts
of charity which are designed to mitigate poverty, by centralizing them in the hands of the
state." Id at 155, quotingANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 93 (1965). He notes
that charity is not generally susceptible to problems of free-riding, nor does it require public
intervention. Id at 157.
The problem that the welfare state is designed to answer, according to Goodin, is the
problem of dependency.

